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The resources of the Persian Gulf are vital to United 
States national interests.  Since the end of the Second 
World War, the United States has gradually increased its 
military presence in the region.  The Arab-Israeli conflict 
coupled with the increase in military presence that has 
characterized the American security posture in the Persian 
Gulf region has contributed to the a negative view of the 
U.S. by the Arab public.  In the post September 11, 
environment the U.S. should seek to decrease its presence 
in the region while maintaining the ability to support 
national goals.  Advancements in technology and 
improvements in interoperability with coalition partners 
achieved through transformation will enable the U.S. Navy 
to build effective coalitions with the GCC navies to 
support American objectives in the Persian Gulf in a Nixon 
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Since the end of the World War II, the United States 
has gradually increased its military presence in the 
Persian Gulf Region.  This presence coupled with the Arab-
Israeli conflict has fueled resentment toward American 
foreign policy by the Arab public. 
While American interests in the Persian Gulf have not 
changed since the United States first became involved in 
the region, the approach to the pursuit of these interests 
has shifted with every president.  The Nixon Doctrine’s 
reliance on the internal political environment of Iran 
directly lead to increased naval presence in the Persian 
Gulf during the Carter and Reagan Presidencies.  The Gulf 
War in 1991 during the Bush Administration marked the peak 
of American military presence in the region.  Since the end 
of the Gulf War the United States national security posture 
in the region has supported a large military presence 
throughout the Persian Gulf. 
In the post-September 11 environment, the U.S. must 
devote resources including naval assets to homeland 
security.  The increased situational awareness, 
interoperability with coalition forces, and the development 
of a common operational picture that integrates 
interagency, Department of Defense and other national 
assets created, as a product of transformation will enable 
the United States Navy to maintain a virtual presence in 
the Persian Gulf.  This virtual presence will manifest 
  x
itself in the form of Arab navies from the GCC linked to a 
web based command and control network operated by the 
United States.  The improved common operational picture 
coupled with improvements in the ability to strike will 
enable the U.S. Navy to decrease its presence in the 
Persian Gulf to operate from over the horizon and free up 
assets for homeland security. 
Improvements to interoperability that result in a 
robust operational picture that stem from transformation 
will enable the United States Navy to coordinate the GCC 
navies to achieve multilateral effects.  This suzerain 
control will promote cooperation without violating or 
threatening any of the GCC states’ sovereignty.  
Analysis in this thesis suggests the United States 
attempt to reduce its military presence in the region.  By 
engaging the navies of the GCC to help improve their 
readiness and build effective coalitions, the U.S. can 
achieve its regional goals vis-à-vis a Nixon Doctrine type 
of approach.  The GCC navies, linked to and coordinated by 
U.S. forces from over the horizon can achieve multilateral 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Since the end of WWI, the Persian Gulf Region’s 
resources have brought it to the forefront of U.S. foreign 
policy.  The end of the Second World War marked a turning 
point in the Middle East; the devastating effects of the 
war on the British economy led to the United States 
steadily increasing its involvement in the region.  This 
coupled with a myriad of approaches by the United States.  
to implement policy in the region has led to a military 
build up and presence that culminated with the presence of 
over 500,000 troops during the Gulf War in 1991.1  Since 
then, a continued military presence coupled with the 
effects of the Arab-Israeli conflict has led to a growing 
disenchantment of American policy in the region.2  At no 
other time in history has Arab public disapproval of the 
United States been as strong.3  The attacks against the 
Khobar towers, the USS COLE and the World Trade Center in 
February of 1993 marked a progressive campaign mounted 
against the United States, which culminated in the attacks 
on the Pentagon and the World Trade Center on September 11, 
2001.4  Today the United States and the United States Navy 
face unprecedented challenges in advancing American policy 
                     
1 Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor, The General’s War, (New 
York, Little, Brown and Company: 1995) ix.  
2 Eric Rouleau, “Trouble in the Kingdom.” Foreign Affairs  
July/August 2002: 77.  
3 Zogby, John.  “The Ten Nation Impressions of America Poll.”  
Zogby International.  Utica, N.Y.  11 April 2002.  On  
https://zogby.com accessed 02 December 2002.  1. 
 
4 Grenville Byford, “The Wrong War.”  Foreign Affairs  July/August 
2002, 42. 
  2 
objectives in the region.  As suggested by public opinion 
polls the Arab public scrutinizes every action taken by the 
United States through the lens of betrayal, mistrust, and 
conspiracy. 
The thesis suggests that American Naval involvement 
with the navies of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) 
states will enhance American policy execution in the 
Persian Gulf Region.  These military to military 
relationships will help build trust, improve the readiness 
of the GCC navies enabling them to perform missions to 
enhance stability in the region.  This, in turn will reduce 
the need for U.S. presence in the gulf, and help promote a 
positive view of the United States by helping to promote 
security without threatening the sovereignty of any of 
these states.  By engaging in Naval coalition building, 
following the principles of transformation, the United 
States can achieve its security goals in the region, while 
at the same time reducing U.S. presence on the ground.  The 
improved situational awareness provided by the integration 
of military capabilities and improved interoperability 
between U.S. and coalition forces in the transformation 
process will enable the United States to return to an “over 
the horizon”5 approach to maintaining security in the 
region.  In returning the United States security posture in 
the region to an over the horizon approach, the task of 
protecting the forces that remain there will be much 
easier.  In the current environment of mistrust and dissent 
to U.S. policy in the region, the United States.  will face 
some resistance to the implementation of U.S. policy.  This 
                     
5 Andrew Fenton Cooper, Richard A Higgott, Kim Richard Nossal, 
“Bound to Follow? Leadership and Followership in the Gulf Conflict,” 
Political Science Quarterly, Volume 106, Issue 3 (Autumn 1991) 396. 
  3 
resistance stems from the American relationship with Israel 
as well as the desire of the ruling regimes to stay in 
power. 
Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, Oman, and the 
United Arab Emirates (UAE)-created the Gulf Cooperation 
Council or GCC in 1981 for collective defense against 
aggression in the Persian Gulf region.6  Although this 
thesis addresses working with the member states of the GCC 
it does not suggest working with the GCC states within the 
framework or confines of the GCC.  The GCC through its own 
admission has had little success in accomplishing regional 
goals.  This thesis argues that the United States Navy, 
while working within the series of bi-lateral agreements7 
with individual GCC states must work to achieve 
multilateral effects.  The bi-lateral nature of the 
agreements with these states can act as an impediment at 
times but also can give the United States flexibility to 
curtail coalitions of the willing to achieve specific 
goals.8  As a result, these bi-lateral agreements will 
provide the United States with the best vehicle to promote 
and advance U.S. policy in the region. 
The U.S. Navy’s role in the region should focus on 
developing a web based common operational picture and a 
command and control network between the United States and 
                     
6 Erik R. Peterson, The Gulf Cooperation Council, Search for Unity 
in a Dynamic Region,  (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press:  1988) xiv. 
7 Interview with CDR Jonathan Christian USN, The Joint Staff, J-5 
Middle East, The Pentagon, Washington D.C., 26 June 2002. 
8 George W. Bush, United States, President, The National Security 
Strategy of the United States of America.  (Washington D.C.: GPO 2002) 
v. 
  4 
the states of the GCC.9  Web based command and control 
allows the United States to coordinate efforts without 
violating the sovereignty of any of these nations.  
Although, the GCC states typically have small navies, the 
development of technologies and the pursuit of a Revolution 
in Military Affairs (RMA) through transformation will have 
a force multiplying effect and enable the United States to 
promote U.S. policy vis-à-vis a Nixon Doctrine10 type 
approach.  In other words, the GCC navies would fulfill 
many of the missions currently executed by the United 
States Navy in the Persian Gulf.  This type of approach 
could overcome one of the GCC’s greatest hindrances since 
their inception: the fear that cooperation could lead to 
sacrificing the individual states’ sovereignty in order to 
promote common goals. 
The inherently “Joint” nature of any future use of 
military force and of naval coalition building in the 
region, demands the United States continue to build up 
infrastructure that can support the deployment of its 
forces and equipment to the region.  Through exercises, the 
United States can help to promote the construction of such 
facilities and test them in order to ensure they are 
capable of supporting large deployments to the region. 
With the build up of infrastructure and naval 
coalitions, the United States can work to uphold 
commitments and already established policy objectives while 
decreasing the physical presence of U.S. forces in the 
                     
9 Department of Defense.  “Executive Summary” from Network Centric 
Warfare.  Report to Congress, September 2001 iv. 
10 Richard Nixon, 1999, Victory without War.  (New York: Simon and 
Schuster: 1988) 122. 
  5 
region, while maintaining the ability to deploy quickly to 
the region to react to any crisis.  The thesis argues that 
the political and cultural environments of the GCC states 
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  7 
II. THE EVOLVING POLICY IN THE MIDDLE EAST 
Today in the wake of the attacks in the United States 
on September 11, 2001, the Persian Gulf Region dominates 
the news and remains a primary focus of American foreign 
policy.  The War on Terrorism, a top priority in the 
National Security Strategy, has led the United States to 
military action in Afghanistan and Yemen, and debate over 
invading Iraq.11  The current situation has evolved over 
many years starting with the conclusion of World War I.  
After the conclusion of WWI a series of agreements, lead to 
the physical shaping of the Middle East by the British and 
French.  After World War II brought devastation to the 
British economy, American involvement in the Middle East 
gradually increased,12 eventually leading to the presence 
the United States maintains today.  The creation of the 
state of Israel in 1948 coupled with the feeling of 
betrayal felt by the Arabs in the aftermath of WWI, has 
created resentment and mistrust of the West throughout the 
Arab world. 
The increased involvement of the United States in the 
region is a by-product of the three consistent policy 
objectives maintained throughout the presidencies from 
Truman to the current Bush administration.  These goals: 
the support of Israel, the containment of the Soviet Union 
(communism), and the free flow of oil have changed, 
gradually shifting in response to world events.  After the 
                     
11 Michael Hirsh, “Bush and the World.”  Foreign Affairs  
September/October 2002: 23-23. 
12 Hesham Islam,  “American Interests in the Persian Gulf.”  The 
Roots of Regional Ambitions,  Masters Thesis, Naval Postgraduate 
School, Monterey ,Ca 1992 .  6. 
  8 
collapse of the Soviet Union, the containment policy 
shifted to the maintenance of “stability” in the region 
through engagement and enlargement.13  American primacy in 
the region developed in the aftermath of the Gulf War.  The 
current National Security Strategy plainly explains the 
pursuit of American primacy in the post September 11, 2001 
environment by building “defenses beyond challenge.”14  The 
focus on oil and support of Israel, while shifting in 
execution has not changed in desired end state. 
A. THE EVOLUTION OF AMERICAN PRESENCE IN THE GULF REGION  
After the conclusion of WWII, the Truman 
administration set the stage for our current involvement in 
the region.  Israel’s birth, the start of the Cold War, and 
demand for oil all helped shape Truman’s policy in the 
region.  Truman’s standoff with the Soviet Union in Iran 
worked to contain Soviet expansion while planting the seeds 
of American hegemony and primacy in the region.15  During 
the war, President Roosevelt met with Stalin and Winston 
Churchill in Iran.  While the inter-allied declaration that 
came from that meeting promised Iran that it would maintain 
its territorial integrity and sovereignty, the United 
States saw Iran’s future as secondary to the preservation 
of its cooperation with the Soviet Union.16  After the war, 
however American policy radically changed toward Iran 
because of the fear of Soviet expansion and oil. 
                     
13 Walter A. McDougal, “Back to Bedrock.”  Foreign Affairs  
March/April 1997: 134.  
14 George W. Bush,  United States, President, The National Security 
Strategy of the United States of America.  (Washington D.C.: GPO 2002 ) 
29. 
15 George Lenczowski,  “The Truman Presidency.”  American Presidents 
and the Middle East,  (Durham, N.C., Duke university Press:  1990)  13. 
16 George Lenczowski, “The Truman Presidency.” 8. 
  9 
In 1950, the United States viewed the events taking 
place in internal Iranian politics as having the potential 
to negatively affect the United States if the Iranian 
communists of the Tudeh party came to power. 
U.S. officials had become alarmed 
about…Iran,…that it might become a ‘second 
china.’…a major effort had to be made…to prevent 
the Tudeh party from coming to power and 
delivering Iran into Soviet hands.17 
To contain the Soviet Union, the United States 
supported the Shah’s appointed Prime Minister, Mussadiq in 
order to minimize the effects of the ongoing oil crisis 
brought on by Britain’s reaction to Iran’s nationalization 
of their oil industry.18  In trying to maintain their 
hegemonic position in the region, Britain tried to oppose 
Mussadiq by pressuring him to not nationalize the Iranian 
oil industry, convincing the oil companies of the world to 
boycott Iranian oil and when these did not work, they 
attempted to covertly overthrow him.  The United States 
viewed the events in Iran differently and publicly 
supported Mussadiq, seeing him as a counterweight to the 
Tudeh party.  Seeing that a protracted oil crisis might 
weaken the U.S. economy and threaten U.S. and Western 
security, Truman’s administration pursued a policy of 
supporting Mussadiq, opposing British efforts to overthrow 
him, and attempting to reach an agreement that would 
satisfy both parties and minimize disruption of the world 
                     
17 Mark Gasiorowski, “U.S. Foreign Policy Toward Iran During the 
Mussadiq Era.”   The Middle East and the United States  2nd ed.  David 
W. Lesch,  (Boulder Colorado: Westview Press, 1996) 54. 
18 George Lenczowski,  “The Eisenhower Presidency.”  35. 
  10 
oil market.19  While Truman realized the importance of the 
world oil market and how it affected the United States 
economy, his administration politically maneuvered to 
establish American primacy in the region by countering the 
British plan to oppose Mussadiq and by opposing the Tudeh 
party.20 
Seeing Soviet expansion as both a military and 
economic threat, Truman initiated an approach based on 
containing the Soviet Union.  His approach manifested 
itself in the Eastern Mediterranean and the near East.  The 
administration forced the Russians to withdraw troops from 
Iran and to give up demands for boundary concessions and 
base rights from Turkey.  In addition, the Administration 
supported the government of Greece against an externally 
supplied communist insurgency and made the presence of the 
Sixth Fleet in waters surrounding Turkey and Greece a 
permanent fixture of the post war world.21  The Truman 
Doctrine committed the United States to building the 
militaries of Iran and Turkey while supporting the 
government in Greece to contain the Soviet Union.  In 
return, Iran was expected to maintain hegemony over the 
Persian Gulf keeping sea-lanes open and ensuring the free 
flow of oil to the world oil market.22  The Truman 
Administration generalized its obligations to Greece and 
Turkey into what appeared to be a worldwide commitment to 
                     
19 Mark Gasiorowski, “U.S. Foreign Policy Toward Iran During the 
Mussadiq Era.” 55.  
20 Mark Gasiorowski, “U.S. Foreign Policy Toward Iran During the 
Mussadiq Era.” 55. 
21 John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1982.)  22. 
22 John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment.  22. 
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resist Soviet expansion wherever it appeared.23  The Truman 
Doctrine formed the groundwork and the base from which all 
U.S. presidents have pursued foreign policy in the Middle 
East since its inception. 
Four main events in the Middle East shaped 
Eisenhower’s policy throughout his presidency: The Iranian 
oil crisis, the Suez crisis, the civil war in Lebanon, and 
the revolution in Iraq.24  In 1951, the Iranians 
nationalized their oil producing assets and facilities run 
by the British company Anglo-Iranian Oil Company or AIOC.25  
As a result, of British actions, the oil companies of the 
world refused to buy Iranian oil.  Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, 
and Iraq increased oil production to replace that oil lost 
by the embargo placed on Iran.  This policy isolated Iran 
and increased American dependence upon fewer states in the 
region for oil while simultaneously irking the remaining 
states.  Attempting to remain neutral throughout the 
crisis, the United States attempted to mediate between the 
two sides but was unsuccessful.  While this oil crisis did 
not originate from American involvement in the region, it 
did involve Britain, and in 1952, the U.S. cut off military 
aid to Iran to show solidarity with the British. 26 
A few years earlier in 1948, the United States 
initiated a naval presence in the region that has remained 
and expanded to this day.  First, Admiral Richard C. 
Connolly, Northeastern Atlantic and Mediterranean 
Commander-in-chief based in London (CINCNELM), created Task 
                     
23 John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment.  22. 
24 George Lenczowski,  “The Eisenhower Presidency.” 31.     
25 George Lenczowski,  “The Eisenhower Presidency.”  32. 
26 George Lenczowski,  “The Eisenhower Presidency.”  33. 
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Force 126 on January 20, 1948.  It consisted of tankers in 
the Gulf to take on oil to meet the increasing dependence 
of the U.S. Navy on refined Gulf petroleum products.  In 
1949 the command was named Middle East Force, and in 1951 a 
rear admiral was placed in its command.  Since then the 
U.S. Navy has maintained a permanent presence in the Gulf 
and operated from Bahrain, the site of a major British 
base.  U.S. naval vessels also frequently visited Ras 
Tannura and Dhahran in Saudi Arabia.  This presence 
reflected the U.S. policy of promoting expansion of Gulf 
oil production to meet the higher demand in the West.27  The 
four crises encountered during the Eisenhower 
Administration contributed to the American decision to 
maintain this new naval presence. 
While the civil war in Lebanon did not effect oil, the 
U.S. decision to land U.S. Marines under the guise of the 
Eisenhower Doctrine showed American resolve in checking 
Soviet expansion.  Discussion of action in Lebanon, given 
its location in the Levant many miles from the Persian Gulf 
may seem peripheral to this thesis, however in checking the 
Soviets the United States ensured American hegemony in the 
region.  The Levant as the home of Israel continues to play 
an active role in events in the Persian Gulf.  A similar 
resolve to contain the Soviets throughout the following 
presidencies and checking Iraq’s aggression in 1991 led to 
the eventual presence the U.S. maintains in the region 
today. 
                     
27 Sami G. Hajjar.  “U.S. Military Presence in the Gulf: 
Challenges and Prospects.”  U.S. Army War College, Strategic 
Studies Institute.  March 2002.  16-17. 
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Years later, with American commitments increasing 
around the world, the United States focused on influencing 
the Middle Eastern states that bordered the Soviet Union in 
the South.28  In trying to reduce American involvement 
around the globe, President Nixon created the Nixon 
Doctrine; describing it, he said it consisted of three 
propositions: 
First, the United States will keep all of its 
treaty commitments. 
Second, we shall provide a shield if a nuclear 
power threatens the freedom of a nation allied 
with us or of a nation whose survival we consider 
vital to our security. 
Third, in cases involving other types of 
aggression, we shall furnish military and 
economic assistance when requested in accordance 
with our treaty commitments.  But we shall look 
to the nation directly threatened to assume the 
primary responsibility of providing the manpower 
for its defense.29 
The Nixon administration shaped its policy toward the 
Middle East based on its assessment that the region’s 
resources were vital to the United States.  While it did 
not counter the hegemonic legacy of the Truman or 
Eisenhower doctrines, it aimed to reduce the physical 
presence of American forces spread throughout the world.  
As the largest oil producers in the region, Nixon’s 
                     
28 Nasser H. Aruri,  “U.S. Policy Toward the Arab-Israeli Conflict.” 
The United States and the Middle East, A Search for New Perspectives.  
Ed.  Hoosang Amirahmadi.  (Albany: State University of New York Press: 
1993)  92.  
29 Richard M. Nixon, radio-television address, November 3, 1969 in 
John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of 
Postwar American National Security Policy (Oxford, London: Oxford 
University Press, 1982) 298. 
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Administration saw Iran and Saudi Arabia as the “Twin 
Pillars”30 that could support American Policy in the region.  
The Twin Pillars Policy led to economic and military 
support for the two countries and continued through to the 
Carter Administration.31 
The Middle East dominated President Carter’s foreign 
policy.  The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the Arab-
Israeli Peace Process, and the Iranian crisis all commanded 
the President’s attention.32  As a candidate for President, 
he emphasized his view on the importance of the Middle East 
in debate. 
As a presidential candidate, he had stated during 
a debate with President Ford that if any country 
should ever again impose an embargo on oil 
against the United States, he would consider such 
a move “an economic declaration of war, and would 
respond instantly in kind.”33 
Seeing the Arab oil embargo of 1973 as blackmail 
rather than a weapon of the Arab states used to retaliate 
against the United States for supporting Israel during the 
1973 War,34 he remarked to many resentful American leaders 
“the greatest nation on earth was being jerked around by a 
few desert states.”35 
                     
30 Gary Sick,  “The United States in the Persian Gulf: From Twin 
Pillars to Dual Containment.” The Middle East and the United States 2nd 
Ed.  David W. Lesch,  (Boulder Colorado: Westview Press, 1996) 278.  
31 Sami G. Hajjar “U.S. Military Presence in the Gulf:  Challenges 
and Prospects”  (Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College:  
March 2002) 17. 
32 George Lenczowski, “The Carter Presidency,” 158. 
33 George Lenczowski, “The Carter Presidency,” 159. 
34 George Lenczowski, “The Carter Presidency,” 159. 
35 George Lenczowski, “The Carter Presidency,” 159. 
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President Carter’s involvement in the Middle East led 
to the creation of the Carter Doctrine.  From Truman to 
Eisenhower and eventually to Carter a system of countries 
constituting the Northern Tier designed to check Soviet 
expansion to the South had gradually grown in the guise of 
a series of agreements.  The countries involved in this 
system were: Greece, Turkey, Iraq, Iran, and Pakistan.  By 
virtue of the Truman and Eisenhower Doctrines as well as 
multilateral (Baghdad Pact, 1955) and bilateral (1959) 
agreements, these countries became links in the protective 
security chain the United States had forged in the area.  
Afghanistan and Iraq were two exceptions in this regional 
alliance system.  After Iraq’s revolution in 1958, it 
defected and chose to follow a neutralist, partly Soviet-
tilted policy.36  It was in this environment coupled with 
the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan that President Carter 
responded to in the State of the Union address on January 
23, 1980, he pledged the defense of the Persian Gulf 
saying: 
Let our position be absolutely clear: An attempt 
by any outside force to gain control of the 
Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an 
assault on the vital interests of the United 
States.  It will be repelled by use of any means 
necessary, including military force.37 
To justify this tough stance Carter pointed to the 
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan saying: 
A successful take-over of Afghanistan would give 
the Soviets a deep penetration between Iran and 
Pakistan, and pose a threat to the rich oil 
fields of the Persian Gulf and to the Crucial 
                     
36 George Lenczowski, “The Carter Presidency,” 203-204. 
37 George Lenczowski, “The Carter Presidency,” 206. 
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waterways through which so much of the world’s 
energy supplies had to pass.38 
Conceived during the Nixon administration the Twin 
Pillars policy, rested American security on the pillars of 
Saudi Arabia and Iran, however after the Iranian revolution 
of 1979, whose fallout would plague Carter until the last 
day of his presidency, one of those pillars fell.  The 
resulting hostage crisis coupled with the Soviet Union’s 
invasion of Afghanistan revealed the weakness of the 
overall strategy.39  By design, the strategy depended upon 
an internally stable Iran.  The idea of supporting American 
interests on internal stability of states in the region 
continues to hinder policy making today. 
Seeing Saudi Arabia as unable to support the needs of 
the United States alone, Carter decided that U.S. military 
intervention offered the best solution.  The result was a 
unilateral effort by the United States to maintain the 
security of oil supplies from the region.  Under Carter, 
the United States developed “a Rapid Defense Force (RDF) to 
provide strategic mobility to the Persian Gulf Region and 
Korea.”40 
Under President Reagan, U.S. military presence in the 
region grew and the relationship with Iran became more 
hostile.  He deactivated the RDF at the end of 1982 and on 
the following day, January 1, 1983 replaced it with U.S. 
Central Command (USCENTCOM).  USCENTCOM’s area of 
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responsibility included Egypt, Sudan, Djibouti, Iran, Iraq, 
Kuwait, Oman, Pakistan, The People’s Republic of Yemen, 
Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates (UAE), Yemen Arab 
Republic, Jordan, Red Sea, and the Arabian (Persian) Gulf.41 
A few months later, during the Iran-Iraq war when Iran 
threatened to block the straight of Hormuz President Reagan 
said: 
I do not believe the free world could stand by 
and allow anyone to close the Straights of Hormuz 
in the Persian Gulf to oil traffic through those 
waterways.42 
 
Later in the year, diplomatic relations with Iraq 
resumed, this coupled with the United States’ addition of 
Iran to the terrorist list pushed Iran further from the 
U.S.43  
The reflagging of Kuwaiti oil tankers served to 
confirm President Reagan’s conviction to keep the Straights 
of Hormuz open and to keep the Soviet Union, which had 
offered to charter Kuwaiti tankers out of the Persian 
Gulf.44  In clarifying American policy in the Gulf, which 
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had come under attack in the U.S. Congress45 President 
Reagan described the American approach in three parts: 
1.  Bringing ever-increasing international 
pressure to bear for a negotiated end to the war 
and to stop its spillover. 
2.  Steadfastly continuing to help our friends, 
the nonbelligerent nations of the Gulf, to defend 
themselves against Iranian threats; and  
3.  Prudently pursuing cooperative efforts with 
the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states and 
other friends to protect against jeopardizing 
freedom of nonbelligerent navigation.46 
 
President Reagan’s policy increased American presence 
in the region but did not shift away from any other 
previously established polices. 
B. THE GULF WAR EFFECT 
The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and its aftermath has 
lead to the greatly increased presence the United States 
maintains today.  With Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait and the 
threat of an invasion of Saudi Arabia, the United States, 
and coalition partners demonstrated, through their action 
to push the Iraqis out of Kuwait, the importance of the 
Gulf Region and its effect on world economies. 
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On August 8 1990, President Bush announced the focus 
of U.S. policy in the region in response to Iraq’s invasion 
of Kuwait summarized in four points: 
1. The complete and unconditional withdraw of 
Iraq forces from Kuwait. 
2. The restoration of the legitimate government 
of Kuwait. 
3. The commitment of the United States to the 
security and stability of the Persian Gulf. 
4. The protection of lives of US citizens 
overseas.47 
 
While these four points did not specifically address 
the importance of oil in U.S. policy, President Bush did 
say in a series of press conferences between August 2 and 
August 8 how important Middle Eastern oil was to the United 
States.  On 2 August 1990 Bush said “we are dependent for 
close to fifty percent of our energy requirements on the 
Middle East,” the next day he warned that the “long-run 
economic effects [of the invasion] on the free world could 
be devastating.”  8 August 1990 he addressed the nation 
saying that the U.S. “could face a major threat to its 
economic independence.’48 
Although, American hegemony or primacy in the region 
had manifested itself in the containment of the Soviet 
Union, President Bush soon began to discuss the context a 
new “World Order.”  Although, he did not use the word 
“primacy” or discuss “military defenses beyond challenge,”49 
as the current administration, President Bush’s National 
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Security Strategy inferred that the United States 
established the rules of conduct for international 
relations for the rest of the world to follow, emphasizing 
the importance and the role of the United Nations.50  
President Bush talked about the rules of conduct in this 
new order. 
Iraq has violated and taken over the territory of 
a country which is a full member of the United 
Nations.  That is totally unacceptable, and if it 
were allowed to endure, then there would be many 
other small countries that could never feel 
safe.51 
Later elaborating on the subject, implying the bi-
polar nature of the cold war shaped the manner in which 
states would interact he said: 
We’ve worked for decades to develop our 
international order, a common code and rule of 
law that promotes cooperation in place of 
conflict. That order is imperfect, we know that.  
But without it peace and freedom are impossible.  
The rule of law gives way to the law of the 
jungle.52 
Although President Bush discussed the increased role 
of the United Nations in this New World Order, the collapse 
of the Soviet Union and the shift from the bi-polar nature 
of the cold war led the rest of the world to see this new 
World order as one headed by a hegemonic United States.53  
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This new strategic vision did not last long, partly because 
the Bush administration was voted out of office in 1992, 
and because much of the rest of the world interpreted the 
“new world order” as hegemony in international affairs by 
the United States in and out of the U.N.54 
The Bush administration’s response to the invasion of 
Kuwait in the context of the American efforts to settle the 
Arab-Israeli conflict showed the interdependence of the 
Levant and the Persian Gulf region.  Saddam Hussein 
attempted to link his withdraw from Kuwait to the Israeli 
withdraw from the Occupied Territories.  If Saddam had been 
successful in this approach, he would have been able to 
resolve the conflict that the United States had been unable 
to solve.  This would have not only helped the Palestinians 
but would give legitimacy to the use of violence as a means 
to advance policy in the Middle East.  Saddam had three 
criteria for his withdrawal: withdrawal of US forces from 
Saudi Arabia and their replacement by Arab forces under UN 
authority; the lifting of sanctions; and, ‘the immediate 
and unconditional withdrawal of Israel from the Occupied 
Arab territories in Palestine, Syria and Lebanon.’55  As a 
result, President Bush insisted on Saddam’s unconditional 
withdrawal from Kuwait to avoid rewarding him for his 
actions. 
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The Gulf War led to the forward deployment of American 
forces that the United States continues to maintain today.  
One of the most common criticisms by the Arab public of 
American foreign policy in the Middle East is America’s 
support for Israel.56  Saddam Hussein tried to exploit this 
common complaint to legitimize his actions throughout the 
Arab world.  His actions demonstrate the link between the 
United States’ policy toward Israel and its policy toward 
the rest of the region. 
During the 1990s, President Clinton continued to 
support the established policies in the Persian Gulf region 
of maintaining the free flow of oil, supporting Israel, and 
maintaining American hegemony.57  With the rejection of the 
idea of a “new world order” by the rest of the world, the 
Bush administration left office issuing a National Security 
Strategy in 1993 that did not include the idea, instead it 
referred to the future as an “Age of Democratic Peace.”58  
The following year, the Clinton administration announced 
its own strategy in the forms of “Engagement and 
Enlargement.”  The United States was to exercise global 
leadership by selectively engaging those challenges 
affecting U.S. interests, and seeking to enlarge the circle 
of democratic countries in the world.59  President Clinton’s 
policy in the Persian Gulf region came in the form of 
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enforcing sanctions on Iraq,60 increasing the American 
security footprint in the region, Dual Containment of Iraq 
and Iran and a dedicated effort to address the Arab-Israeli 
conflict.61  In theory, the Clinton administration’s 
approach to Dual Containment enabled President Clinton to 
dedicate the majority of his efforts toward pursuing Peace 
between Israel and the Palestinians.  Unfortunately, the 
Dual Containment policy failed due to the false premises 
upon which it was based.62 
In 1993, the Clinton administration announced the Dual 
Containment policy designed “to confront the ‘rogue’ threat 
in the Gulf.”63  Dr Martin Indyk, then senior director for 
Middle East Affairs of the National Security Council, 
described the central concepts of the policy. 
Interdependence between the eastern and western 
halves of the region: thus, containing the 
threats posed by Iraq and Iran in the east will 
impact our ability to promote peace between 
Israel and its Arab neighbors in the west; 
similarly, promoting Arab-Israeli peace in the 
west will impact our ability to contain the 
threats from Iraq and Iran in the east; and our 
success in both realms will affect our ability to 
help friendly governments create a better life 
for their peoples than that offered by proponents 
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of violence.64 
Unfortunately, there were a number of flaws to this 
policy.  First, the Clinton Administration tried to pursue 
a policy dependent upon the actions of Iraq and Iran, two 
countries with regimes hostile to the United States.65  It 
is impossible for the United States to affect the balance 
of military power between these two countries if the United 
States could not arm either one to balance their military 
strength.  Second, the Arab public throughout the region 
saw the policy as an “Israel first” policy that would 
promote the interests of Israel above those of the 
Palestinians.66 
The Clinton administration’s Dual Containment policy 
coupled with Engagement and Enlargement manifested in 
engagement, forward presence, and rapid response.67  With 
its roots in the Carter administration’s RDF, this policy 
continues today in a vastly increased footprint in the 
region. 
C. CONCLUSION 
Since the end of World War II, policies enacted by the 
Presidents of the United States have gradually led to the 
presence of U.S. military forces in the Gulf today.  The 
Truman and Nixon Doctrines relied heavily on the internal 
security of states in the Persian Gulf, specifically on the 
Shah of Iran.  When the Twin Pillars policy failed because 
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of the Iranian revolution, the United States increased its 
military presence in the region.  Later, the Gulf War 
marked the greatest presence in the region as the United 
States worked to drive Iraqi forces from Kuwait.  President 
Clinton’s flawed ”Dual Containment” policy also relied upon 
the internal environment of states in the region.  Finally, 
engagement has worked to build the complex presence the 
U.S. maintains today. 
The policies designed over the years to contain the 
Soviet Union worked to establish American primacy in the 
region,68 which has never been a formally declared national 
goal of the United States.  However, the current Bush 
administration’s National Security Strategy supports 
American primacy by directing the U.S. military to maintain 
superiority, and by stating the United States will lead 
coalitions to advance U.S. goals.69  The current security 
posture in the region is composed of four parts: ensuring 
access to host nation facilities for ongoing operations and 
contingencies through bilateral agreements; pre-positioning 
of military equipment; building host nation self defense 
capabilities through foreign military sales, training and 
joint exercises and providing a continuously deployed 
forward U.S. military presence in the region.70  These parts 
stem from the constantly evolving set of policies initiated 
during the Truman a administration.  These policies 
promoted American policy in the region, but they also 
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contributed to the backlash against the United States in 
the form of the attacks against the World trade Center in 
1993, the Khobar Towers, the attack on the USS COLE (DDG 
67), and culminated in the attacks on the Pentagon and 
World Trade Center on 11 September 2001. 
There must be a change in this posture, which will 
continue to promote the interests of the United States 
while reducing the threat to the United States resulting 
from the hatred invoked by U.S. policy in the region.71  The 
building of naval coalitions in the region in the context 
of the defense department’s transformation enabled by a 
revolution in military affairs will promote the security 
posture in place while enabling the United States to reduce 
its physical presence on Arab soil.  Through improvements 
in technology, the United States can pursue its national 
security agenda by working with the GCC navies and not 
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III. AMERICA’S RELATIONSHIP WITH ISRAEL HINDERING 
COALITION BUILDING WITH THE GCC STATES 
The U.S. relationship with Israel negatively and 
indirectly affects its relationship with the Gulf 
Cooperation Council (GCC) states.  Other factors, however 
negatively affect America’s ability to execute its foreign 
policy in the region. 
The Clinton administration’s engagement and 
enlargement policy designed to promote democracy in the 
region was met with resistance in the GCC.  The reasons for 
resisting the development of democracy parallel the reasons 
for resisting naval coalition building.  First, there is a 
weak cultural impetus for the development of democracy in 
the region.  The Arab states have no cultural, socio-
political, or economic history, which supports democracy.72  
In fact, their rentier structures supported by their 
political cores inhibit the development of democracy or 
other changes which might negatively affect the internal 
security of these states.  Building strong and capable 
naval forces would require these states to divert defense 
funds away from forces, which provide internal security to 
their regimes or divert funds away from their constituents, 
to whom these governments distribute their funds.73 
Second, the states of the region are wary of any U.S. 
involvement in the region seeing it as imperialism.  They 
see the United States as a Western power more likely to 
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break promises than to keep them.  The Arab view of Israel 
as both an imperialistic power and a vestige of Western 
imperialism in the region shape their opinions of American 
Middle East policy.74  Third, the GCC states use the 
American relationship with Israel as a potential counter-
weight for U.S. demands preventing the United States from 
influencing the domestic and military environments of these 
states.75  Finally, the ruling elites of the GCC states use 
the American relationship with Israel to distract their own 
populations to halt any desire for internal political 
change.76  The factors listed above show the United States’ 
relationship with Israel has less influence on the United 
States’ ability to promote American policy in the region 
than the history, cultural and social structures of the GCC 
states.  To promote American foreign policy objectives in 
the region to include naval coalition building, the United 
States must overcome strong forces of resistance rooted 
deeply in the culture and socio-political structures 
inherent to the region. 
A. WEAK IMPETUS FOR DEMOCRATIC DEVELOPMENT IN THE GCC 
The impetus for the development of democracy in the 
region is weak due to the political economies, the 
weaknesses in the states inherent their rentier structures 
and their cultures.  The entire region will resist 
democracy for these reasons that have nothing to do with 
the United States’ relationship with Israel.  A drive to 
promote democratic development in the region could 
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destabilize these states.  The regimes’ tenuous hold on 
power forces them to work to maintain the status quo rather 
than accept democracy.77 
The first obstacle to democratic development in the 
GCC states lies in the resistance to change presented by 
the social orders established by the ruling regimes to 
consolidate their power.  In Saudi Arabia, the Wahhabis 
preach a form of Islam that says the Koran and the Prophet 
are the only true sources of Islamic direction and 
guidance.78  The Wahhabis’ strong connection with the past 
and linkage to the Prophet helps lend prestige and 
legitimacy to their order.  They promote the “purity” of 
this form of Islam.  Using Islam as a lever to maintain 
their power and legitimacy the Saudi Royal family has made 
an alliance with the Wahhabi clerics establishing a social 
order the clerics dominate. 79  The Wahhabis preach about 
the legitimacy of the Saudi Royal family’s rule in exchange 
for societal power over everyday Muslim life in Saudi 
Arabia such as marriage and women’s rights.  For the Saudi 
Royal family, maintaining the Islamist nature of the 
country keeps them in power. 
The alliance with the Wahhabi clerics represents the 
sort of “core” alliance the non-democratic regimes in the 
GCC have formed to solidify their power.  This sort of 
alliance concentrates political power in a governmental 
center or core and limits the scope of possible reform in a 
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manner, which parallels what has been named the 
“revolutionary paradox.”  The revolutionary paradox is 
characterized by limits restricting possible reforms 
imposed on regimes, that have come to power in a 
revolutionary manner.  These limits stem from power sharing 
between ruling elites and with a revolutionary core that 
enables a regime to rule but at a political price.  The 
ruling regimes of the GCC states rule without the broad 
society-based mandate to rule.  As result, these 
governments face two types of obstacles to reform, change, 
developing foreign policy, or to embracing democracy.  
First, the existing power centers, in the societies these 
ruling regimes rule force them to make arrangements or face 
crippling resistance.  This limits their ability to make, 
but the shallowest of reforms.  Second, a limited popular 
mandate makes their hold on power tenuous, and makes the 
power centers created in the course of reforming society 
threats to the new order.  Weighing the desire to maintain 
power against the desire to reform, these governments 
cripple, or, in the case of the GCC states, never start to 
institute a reform agenda.  The GCC states have created a 
network of praetorian institutions to maintain their power 
but limit their ability to reform.80  The praetorian 
institutions take the form of either political institutions 
or internal security forces.  The security forces may feel 
threatened by the desire of the regime to develop strong 
naval forces or forces with strong ties to other nations.  
The people who make up the political institutions, do not 
want to lose their place in the political order.  For 
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example, in Qatar the chief of state is Amir Hamad bin 
khalifa Al Thani.  He is head of state, minister of 
defense, and commander in chief of the armed forces.  His 
brothers hold the other two positions in the executive 
branch of Prime Minister and Deputy Prime Minister.81  It 
seems unlikely the chief of state would be able to initiate 
reforms that would eliminate his brothers’ positions or 
power.  This revolutionary paradox exists in the GCC states 
independently of U.S. foreign policy in Israel, and acts to 
hinder any attempt the United States makes to promote 
democracy or any other policy in the region. 
Although, the U.S. relationship with Israel adversely 
affects America’s ability to promote democracy in the GCC 
states, these states, with their distributive structures 
will inherently resist the development of democracy 
irrespective of American policy.82  The political cores of 
these states will work to maintain power at the expense of 
improving overall conditions within their states and for 
their peripheral social and political sectors.  In other 
words, American policy, and the United States’ 
relationships with other states has no impact when 
examining the relationship between the center and the 
periphery within the societal structures of these states.  
In the 1960s, the social structure in Egypt paralleled that 
of the current GCC states.  For this reason, I will show 
how Joel S. Migdal’s analysis explains the inherent 
resistance to development that exists in the GCC states as 
it did in Nasser’s Egypt. 
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Gamal Abdul Nasser faced obstacles created as a by-
product of his rise to power as he attempted to institute 
land reforms in Egypt in the 1960s.  To institute his 
reforms he created the instruments that impeded his own 
progress.  Migdal explains saying: 
The pre-Revolutionary social structure came to 
influence deeply the disposition of land and 
other benefits of the reform.  In the end, this 
social structure limited the growth in state 
strength and helped shape the nature of politics 
within the institutions of the state.  Thus 
society transformed the state.83 
Nasser failed in many of his efforts to reform because 
of his primary focus to remain in power.  As a result, 
Nasser blamed external actors for his failures; among them 
were the United States and Israel.  Like Nasser, the 
regimes in the Persian Gulf States will be forced to limit 
their own attempts to reform to remain in power.  While the 
ruling regimes in these states may desire to build strong 
naval coalitions, they may be limited by their societal 
obligations.  It is arguable that all of these states 
classify the information about their bi-lateral agreements 
and exercises with the United States secret to keep their 
praetorian cores from knowing about the exact nature of 
their relationships with the U.S.  Saddam Hussein and his 
Republican guard units form a similar core of power, which 
eliminates any sort of potential for reform in Iraq.  
Although, Iraq is beyond the scope of this paper, the 
example of Saddam Hussein clearly depicts the self-imposed 
limits from the revolutionary paradox, which parallels the 
governmental dispositions in the GCC states. 
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Beyond the structural limits to the promotion of 
democracy in the regions stemming from the distributive 
nature of the GCC states, the culture and history of the 
region does not support naval coalition building, or any 
naval development. 
While the Clinton Administration promoted the spread 
of democracy,84 it must be remembered that democracy grew 
out of the Enlightenment and is rooted in the idea of 
autonomy of the individual, an idea the governments in 
Persian Gulf region have never embraced.  Although these 
states were exposed to the West, they failed to learn about 
this “enlightenment thinking.” 
The tragedy is that Arabs,…have never had 
systematic access to the modern advances rooted 
in ‘the legacy of the Enlightenment, an 
ideological revolution that led to the debunking 
of medieval and reformational cosmologies and the 
undermining of feudal forms of political 
authority and theistic forms of moral 
authority.’85 
While Western culture broke away from the past 
characterized by feudalism, and rule legitimized through 
religion, to move toward secularism; the Arab Muslims did 
not since Islam rejects the idea of popular sovereignty.  
The Arabs never broke away from using the sacred to 
legitimize and mask arbitrary rule: 
The Muslims did not think of the phenomenon of 
modernity in terms of rupture with the past, but 
rather in terms of renewed relation with the 
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past.  They didn’t think about the phenomenon of 
modernity in terms of progress, but in terms of 
renaissance-thus, after all, in terms of magic or 
myth.  In a majority of cases the Muslim 
approach, the approach of religious and political 
thinkers, was just the reverse of the principles 
implied by correct understanding of Enlightenment 
thought.86 
In the manner Western culture values progress, 
development, growth, change and the future, Muslim society 
values connections with the past.  This is still true 
today, and the Arabs see democracy as a product of the West 
that threatens their ties with the past.  The Arabs 
associate democracy with the infidels who turn away from 
the past.  From this alone, it is clear there is a weak 
impetus for the development of democracy in the region.  In 
a similar manner, historically the GCC states have never 
maintained strong navies.  To do so, may be viewed as 
embracing Western values. 
B. AVOIDING THE SECOND GREAT BETRAYAL 
Arabs of the GCC states have mistrusted the West since 
the conclusion of the First World War, when the Sikes Picot 
Agreement took precedence over promises made to Sharif 
Hussein of Mecca by Sir Henry McMahon in “the Great 
Betrayal.”87  Seeing the Balfour Declaration, the creation 
of the state of Israel and the United States’ immediate 
recognition of Israel88 as products of this betrayal, the 
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Arabs continue to be suspicious of the United States.  Wary 
of a second Great Betrayal and seeing the United States’ 
support of Israel as a continuation of the first, the GCC 
States are likely to reject any attempt to promote naval 
coalition building as yet another aspect of Western 
imperialism and the betrayal’s continuation. 
Seeing Israel as the last vestige of hard imperialism, 
the governments and the citizens of the Persian Gulf states 
are wary of any potential influence the United States may 
have on change within their countries.89  They view this 
sort of influence as cultural imperialism.  In the 
environment of globalization, American culture and 
influence have the potential to penetrate every level of 
Middle Eastern society.  The democratic ideals infused in 
American society such as equality, popular sovereignty and 
women’s rights are also a part of American foreign policy.  
Although in the Persian Gulf, the United States tends not 
to overly assert the promotion of these ideals they are 
still inherent in American policy.  While American policy 
makers are aware that these ideals are not necessarily well 
received in the region, they must be a part of what the 
United States does in order to be legitimate in the eyes of 
the American public.  Martin Indyk, who served as Special 
Assistant to the President and as Senior Director for Near 
East and South Asia on the staff of the National Security 
Council in 1993-1995 explains how the Clinton 
administration implemented the support of democracy in the 
region. 
The United States did not ignore political reform 
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entirely; it just tinkered with it on the 
margins.  The Clinton administration supported 
the right of women to vote in Qatar, Oman, and 
Kuwait (in the case of Kuwait, granting that 
right was defeated by Islamic fundamentalists)…It 
supported successful efforts by the kings of 
Morocco and Jordan to co-opt their political 
oppositions into government and parliament.  And 
it made significant effort to support democratic 
reforms in Yemen in the hope that, over time, 
change there might spur similar reforms in the 
rest of the Arabian Peninsula.  But when it came 
to the mainstays of U.S. interest in the Arab 
world, Egypt and Saudi Arabia, Washington left 
well enough alone.90 
Here Indyk describes how the Clinton administration 
tactfully implemented the promotion of democracy trying to 
avoid any destabilization.  The administration chose to 
promote democracy in those countries where a loss in 
stability caused by a loss of internal security would have 
little or no impact on the United States.  In contrast, the 
United States did not promote democracy where a loss of 
stability could negatively affect the economy of the United 
States.  As a result, the promotion of democracy became a 
secondary goal behind maintaining stability in the region.  
Although the promotion of democracy was secondary in 
importance to the maintenance of stability, the Clinton 
administration was able to maintain legitimacy in the eyes 
of the American public and apply indirect pressure on Saudi 
Arabia and Egypt. 
The populations of the GCC states may see American 
foreign policy as cultural imperialism, or a subtle attempt 
to establish dominance or hegemony over the region.  They 
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may also see the United States using American ideals to 
invade Muslim society.  The United States uses McDonalds, 
Coca-Cola, and other American products to establish a 
foothold in the Persian Gulf, from which it can subtly 
influence Muslim culture and sway public opinion.  These 
influences, in the eyes of the regimes in power could 
weaken the political control of the ruling elites by 
influencing the populations to become more “American” and 
seek leaders that are more amenable to the United States.  
In other words, these regimes see the United States trying 
to influence their populations to overthrow their rulers.91  
The influence on the domestic markets, through arms sales 
could lead, to the U.S. making demands upon the ruling 
regimes in these states as well.  While the Arab navies 
play a smaller role than the armies and air forces in their 
respective states because they do not provide internal 
security, coalition building and interaction with American 
forces may be perceived as leading to increased American 
influence on their states.  Again, the Arabs see this sort 
of influence as imperialism. 
The GCC states are so wary of imperialism and 
violations of their sovereignty by other Arab members of 
the GCC that they have failed to achieve goals they 
originally set out to accomplish when the GCC was 
established in 1981.92  In December 2001 Saudi Arabia’s 
Crown Prince Abdullah summed up the limited progress of the 
GCC saying: 
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We are not ashamed that we have not been able to 
achieve the objectives we sought when we set up 
the GCC 20 years ago…  We have not set up a 
unified military force that deters enemies and 
supports friends.  We have not reached a common 
market, or formulated a unified political 
position on political crisis.  Objectivity and 
frankness require us to declare that all that has 
been achieved is too little and it reminds us of 
the bigger part that has yet to be 
accomplished…We are still moving at a slow pace 
that does not conform with the modern one…Our too 
great attachment to the traditional concept of 
sovereignty is the biggest stumbling block 
hindering unification efforts.93 
While the United States struggles to promote democracy 
in the region, Abdullah’s comments show these states resist 
the plans and policies they have formally agreed to 
implement with other Arab states.  This resistance shows 
that these states resist any changes resulting from 
pressures from external sources.  If they resist changes 
resulting from agreements with other, Arab states then it 
should not come as a surprise that these states would 
resist any American policy, which appeared to violate their 
sovereignty.  Also, since they resist this type of pressure 
to change from Arab states, it is arguable that they would 
resist any policy they deemed as a threat to their 
sovereignty showing there is no connection between the 
U.S.’ support for Israel and promoting American policy in 
this region. 
After the Gulf War, President George Bush promised to 
address the Palestinian issue in response to Arab coalition 
support in fighting against Iraq.  The resulting Madrid 
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Peace conference offered some hope for resolution to the 
conflict, but ultimately failed.94  Seeing this attempt to 
solve the problem, as another broken promise, it makes 
sense the Arabs are wary of any U.S. involvement in the 
region. 
C. THE ISRAELI COUNTERWEIGHT 
While the United States’ relationship with Israel does 
not directly influence the American relationship with the 
GCC, these states could use it as a potential counterweight 
to U.S. demands.  Seeing the U.S. demands as external 
threats to their regimes, they use the policy in Israel to 
deflect American attempts to implement policy.  While the 
U.S. may try to promote American policy in the region, the 
ruling regimes can point to the regime in Israel and argue 
that the Israelis are un-just due to their treatment of the 
Palestinian Muslims and that Israel is the last vestige of 
Western imperialism in the region.  To the GCC states, the 
Israelis engage in imperialistic expansion in the West bank 
and represent European imperialism from the Great 
Betrayal.95  As an “ethnocracy” as opposed to a democracy, 
Israel supports the “non-democratic seizure of the country 
by one ethnic group:” Jews.96  For this, the United States’ 
foreign policy appears to be hypocritical.  If U.S. policy 
is hypocritical in Israel, then the promotion of any 
American policy in the Persian Gulf region is also 
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hypocritical.  Therefore U.S. policy does not serve the 
“lofty goals” inherent in American democracy.  Instead, the 
United States seeks to encourage democracy or for the 
purposes of this thesis, naval coalition building, in the 
region to advance imperialistic goals.  To reject the 
United States’ efforts on these grounds makes sense for the 
survival of the ruling regimes. 
While the current Bush administration has pushed for 
the removal of Saddam Hussein from power,97 the leaders of 
the Persian Gulf States have argued that resolution of the 
Arab-Israeli conflict should take precedence.  The Arabs 
focus on using the situation in Israel as a counter weight 
to American policy makers from promoting American foreign 
policy.  This has the effect of weakening American hegemony 
in the Persian Gulf by not allowing the United States to 
have a free hand in policy implementation in the region.  
The Arabs do not reject the American policy in a 
confrontational manner; they simply work to delay its 
implementation.98  This approach appeases internal unrest 
and anger for American policy and keeps the United States 
at bay.  A recent article in Ha’aretz, shows the Iraqi 
issue has been at the center of the dispute between the 
Bush administration and U.S. allies in the Arab world.  The 
U.S. argues that Iraq is the main threat to regional 
stability, while the Egyptians and Saudis argue that the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict poses the greatest danger, and 
have demanded that the Americans restrain Prime Minister 
                     
97 Patrick E. Tyler,  “Security Council Votes, 15-0, For Tough Iraq 
Resolution; Bush Calls it a ‘Final Test’, Clock Ticks for Hussein.”  
New York Times  9 November 2002: A1. 
98 Barry Rubin,  “The Real Roots of Arab Anti-Americanism.”  Foreign 
Affairs.  November/December 2002.  74. 
  41 
Ariel Sharon.99  The Saudis and the Egyptians work to hold 
off the United States because the internal unrest created 
by dissatisfaction with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict 
more directly threatens their regime stability than the 
external threat from Iraq.  In addition, the United States’ 
eagerness to take on the Iraqis guarantees their protection 
from Saddam. 
D. THE ISRAELI DISTRACTION 
The United States’ relationship with Israel negatively 
affects U.S. relations in the Persian Gulf because it 
indirectly threatens to decrease the internal security of 
the Persian Gulf states.  The ruling elites of the GCC 
states couch their internal security in their abilities to 
appease the populations of their states and preventing them 
from violently over throwing their regimes.  The ruling 
regimes in the GCC point to American policy in Israel to 
distract their populations from criticizing them.  These 
populations view American support of Israel as support for 
a country that oppresses and kills Palestinians.  To these 
populations, when the ruling regimes of these states engage 
in political, military, and economic activities with the 
United States, then these regimes support the United 
States: the supporter of Israel.  Therefore, these regimes 
support the oppression of Palestinians and Western 
imperialism as well.  Again, this explains why the bi-
lateral agreements with the United States and all naval 
exercises are kept secret.  In response to the perceived 
threat to their internal security, the GCC states condemn 
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American foreign policy either through words or through 
actions, hindering its execution. 
The GCC states use the United States’ relationship 
with Israel to distract their populations to avoid making 
internal political changes and as a type of political 
relief valve to release excess internal political pressure 
from them.  As Nasser, used excuses for his failures that 
pointed to forces external to Egypt, so too will the 
Persian Gulf States.  Rather than wait for the failure of 
reforms, these states will use the United States’ 
relationship with Israel to preempt any attempt to promote 
American foreign policy within their borders.100  These 
regimes will point to the Arab-Israeli conflict as a 
problem that must first be “fixed” by the United States.  
In an interview in the New York Times Hosni Mubarak of 
Egypt suggested the United States needed to address its 
‘bad image’ in the Arab world by demonstrating a stronger 
commitment to the creation of a Palestinian State.  The New 
York Times argues the government of Egypt is among several 
in the Arab world under pressure from the young and the 
unemployed to do more to ease economic hardship either 
through more democracy or greater devotion to Islam.  For 
these malcontents, Egypt’s ties to the United States bring 
only a repugnant association with American support for 
Israel.  During the interview, the Egyptian leader brushed 
aside questions about the need for greater openness and 
democracy in the Arab world, refusing to discuss the trial 
of a prominent political activist, Saad Eddin Ibrahim, and 
asserting that, in Egypt, “we have all kinds of 
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democracy.”101  During this reported interview Mubarak used 
the Arab-Israeli conflict as a counter weight to external 
U.S. pressure for the development of democracy, 
simultaneously distracted internal forces from the “the 
young and the unemployed” within his country through his 
comments about democracy. 
E. CONCLUSION 
The relationship between the Persian Gulf states’ 
ruling regimes and their populations is distributive: the 
governments do not tax their people, they simply “buy them 
off” by distributing money collected through external sales 
of oil (rents).102  Understanding that their populations 
could revolt against their rule, the ruling regimes in the 
GCC states focus a great deal of effort on maintaining 
internal security.  These regimes maintain security forces 
to provide protection to the ruling elites and do not 
tolerate anti-governmental movements.  This sort of 
alliance with a “security force” limits the possibility for 
reform in the region in what has come to be called the 
revolutionary paradox. 
The GCC states: Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, United Arab 
Emirates, Bahrain, Oman and Qatar need support from the 
United States to maintain external security.  By 
establishing a military relationship with the United 
States, which provides a free ride on American protection 
from external threats, these states do not need to invest 
large amounts of money into their own militaries.  These 
regimes are free to spend the money they would normally 
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need to invest in defense on projects that help appease 
their constituents.  In contrast, the presence of American 
military forces in these states acts to upset the 
populations of these states because of their opposition to 
American support for Israel.  The populations of the GCC 
states view the United States as a supporter of Israel and 
as infidels.  Moreover, the presence of infidels in the 
Arabian Peninsula violates the popular notion that infidels 
should not occupy the Arabian Peninsula. 
On the governmental level, American support for Israel 
does not upset the Persian Gulf states.  The most important 
focus of all of the regimes in the region is to remain in 
power.  It seems in these societies where the ruling elites 
function in the distributive structure, public opinion 
would not weigh heavily enough to shape foreign policy.  
However, the ruling elites show they are extremely 
sensitive to public opinion as long as the regimes continue 
to associate with the United States for collective external 
security and rents.  For example, recently Saudi Arabian 
public opinion influenced Crown Prince Abdullah’s visit to 
the United States, driving him to meet with the President, 
in Texas at President Bush’s ranch rather than in 
Washington.  By not going to Washington, Crown Prince 
Abdullah symbolically showed the people of Saudi Arabia 
that he does not support the foreign policy of the 
President.103 
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The ruling elites in the GCC states must initiate 
internal economic reforms to narrow the gap between them 
and their populations.  To promote economic reform these 
states need to work away from their rentier or distributive 
structures.  This may prove to be the greatest hurdle for 
these states to overcome.  This sort of structure enables 
the ruling elites to govern without much consent from their 
populations.  However, the social orders in their states 
and the alliances they have made with them to ensure the 
longevity of their reigns limit their ability to reform.  
To shift away from this system to a more open or democratic 
system these governments would need to tax their 
populations.  It seems that the populations making this 
sort of shift would be resistant to this change.  While 
this sort of change may be tumultuous, strong naval 
coalitions can help maintain the free flow of oil to the 
world oil market and minimize the negative effects of the 
internal reform process. 
Since September 11, 2001 it is difficult to argue that 
the United States should support stability over the 
development of democracy in the Persian Gulf States.  Saudi 
Arabia produced 15 of the 19 highjackers who flew the 
planes into the World Trade Center and Pentagon104 as well 
as the leader of the entire organization, which was 
responsible for the attacks.  If the Saudi Royal family can 
create, an environment in their state that fosters enough 
hatred of them to motivate their citizens to attack the 
Royal Family’s perceived backers in that sort of manner, 
then the manner in which the United States Navy engages in 
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IV. PATRON CLIENT NETWORKS IN COALITION BUILDING 
The political environment of the Persian Gulf region 
maintains elements of its tribal history.  Patron client 
networks are common in Arab and Islamic culture and stem 
from the tribal traditions of the region.  Examining this 
sort of social structure can help show how the U.S. Navy 
can approach coalition building with the GCC states.  The 
U.S. Navy’s strength in order of battle and technology 
enables it to interact with GCC navies in a hegemonic 
manner that parallels the way the conquering Arabs, who 
spread the Arab Muslim empire after the death of Muhammad, 
interacted with the indigenous populations of conquered 
lands.  
The Arab States have a history of patron client 
networks established in society stemming from the time of 
the Ottoman Empire.  Historically these informal 
organizations headed by notables existed as the vehicle to 
act between an individual and the state.  Patrons have 
provided their clients with services normally provided by a 
government or access to government services that their 
clients could not access alone.  In addition, the GCC 
states have a history of coexistence under the British 
suzerain.  The U.S. Navy can and does provide access to 
services not available to the Arab navies on their own.  
The U.S. Navy provides training and doctrine that are 
normally unavailable to the GCC navies.  Given naval forces 
of the GCC states do not provide internal security for 
their governments, coupled with the history of notables 
throughout Arab society, the U.S. Navy has the opportunity 
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to engage these Arab navies in the role of a patron, 
without threatening the internal security of the GCC 
states. 
A. ARAB NAVAL HISTORY, A HISTORY OF MEDIOCRITY 
The Arab states have little or no tradition of naval 
power.  Arab military strength in the form of Armies came 
from their faith in Islam and how they embraced the 
religion as a motivating tool.  Throughout history, Arab 
navies have suffered defeats at the hands of European 
powers: Portugal, Spain, France, and Britain. 
Traditionally, Arabs have not maintained standing 
naval forces in the Persian Gulf.  Throughout history, the 
Arabs and Ottomans built naval forces for specific 
conquests but did not maintain standing fleets.  Their 
maritime interests focused more on trade than on naval 
capabilities; while they did engage in naval battles in the 
Mediterranean their Persian Gulf operations supported trade 
in the Indian Ocean. 
Bernard Lewis highlights the weaknesses of the Ottoman 
navy describing the conflict with Portugal. 
The danger was real and growing.  When the 
Portuguese…at the end of the fifteenth 
century…opened a…route between Europe and Asia… 
the sultan of Egypt…paid little attention, but a 
sharp decline in his customs revenues focused his 
attention more sharply on this new problem.  
Egyptian naval expeditions against the 
Portuguese…were…unsuccessful… 
The Ottomans now took over this task, but fared 
little better.  Their efforts to counter the 
Portuguese at the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea 
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were at best inconclusive.105 
Lewis then argues that the Ottomans were simply not 
interested in naval development. 
Ottoman naval weakness was further demonstrated when 
“it exposed Egypt to invasion by Napoleon in 1798.”106 
Unsuccessful in naval warfare the Ottomans focused on 
trade throughout the empire. 
Products from Iran, the Persian Gulf, and the Red 
Sea helped make the empire a flourishing center 
of international trade.107 
 
British interests in the Persian Gulf region stemmed 
from their interests in maintaining ties with India.  
Later, in consolidating trade with Iran, 
The English helped...expel the Portuguese from 
the Persian Gulf port of Hormuz and to create 
Bandar ‘Abbas as a new port for Persian-Indian 
Ocean trade.108 
 
After losing control of the region for a short period; 
In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the 
English reestablished their supremacy in the 
Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf.109 
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This period known as “pax Britania” lasted over 150 
years until the British withdrew from the region in 1971.110  
During this period, the British suzerain did not feel 
threatened by the weak Arab navies. 
Our concern is only with maritime commerce in the 
Gulf…it matters not to us whether one power or 
another holds dominion over its shores.111 
 
The Ottoman Empire posed the greatest threat to 
British control of the region.  However the focus of this 
competition was Kuwait where the Ottomans intended to 
project military power via  
The envisioned terminus for the proposed Berlin-
Constantinople-Baghdad railway system.112 
 
The only way the Arabs could test British rule was on 
land.  Unchallenged at sea, the British ruled the Persian 
Gulf. 
B. HISTORICAL RELATIONSHIPS OF SUZERAINTY  
After the death of Muhammad, Islam spread at a 
ferocious rate.  The religion served as the driving force 
that led to the expansion of the Arab-Muslim empire.  One 
of the reasons for the rapid expansion of Islam was the 
Arabs' utilization of suzerainty to govern conquered lands.  
The rate of expansion and success of the Arab-Muslim Empire 
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parallels the rapid expansion of the Ottoman as well.  
These empires expanded over vast masses of land in short 
periods.  The application of suzerainty marked the 
expansion of both empires.  In examining the use of 
suzerainty, cultural attributes of the Arabian navies will 
be revealed, which will aid in the shaping of coalition 
building in the region.  The U.S. Navy can utilize 
suzerainty in coalition building in the region. 
Arab control of conquered lands took the form of 
suzerainty.  This instituted a system that did not change 
the autonomy of existing rulers, relieving the Arabs of a 
great deal of administrative responsibilities while adding 
to the empire.  If the Arabs had not instituted the use of 
suzerainty, their expansion would have slowed in order to 
establish new governments for their conquered subjects.  
Ultimately conquered peoples' lives changed very little 
after being conquered which reduced the potential for 
revolution and increased stability within the empire. 
Like the Arab-Muslim Empire, the Ottoman Empire spread 
rapidly over large areas.  Given that the Ottoman Empire 
was also a Muslim empire, its expansion closely matches the 
Arab-Muslim empire's expansion.  Like the Arabs, the 
Ottomans utilized suzerainty to rule over their new 
conquests without the having the burden of presiding over 
the everyday governmental tasks specific to each region. 
The Ottoman Empire's use of suzerainty manifested 
itself in the millet system of government.  In this system, 
the Ottomans did not force their subjects to convert to 
Islam although they could if they desired to.  They were 
able to maintain their religious practices, autonomy as a 
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community and customs.113  Like the Arabs, the Ottomans used 
this system to govern without the burden of being overly 
involved with local matters.  This sort of arrangement 
helped maintain the rapid pace of expansion experienced in 
the Ottoman Empire. 
This pattern of external domination and suzerain rule 
established during the earliest Muslim empires continued 
throughout the period of British naval domination of the 
Persian Gulf.  The states surrounding the Gulf had been 
ruled through the Ottoman suzerain; therefore, when the 
British became the regional hegemon, their use of 
suzerainty to rule fit with accepted practice in the 
region.  Today the United States has replaced the British 
as regional hegemon.  However the security posture of the 
in the region reflects a more controlling approach and a 
lesser suzerain relationship between the U.S. and the GCC 
states.  By moving over the horizon, U.S. naval forces can 
coordinate the efforts of the GCC navies in a suzerain 
fashion. 
C. PATRON CLIENT RELATIONSHIPS 
One difference between the Ottoman and the Arab-Muslim 
Empires was in the complex social structure of the Ottoman 
Empire that gave rise to patron client networks, which did 
not exist in the Arab-Muslim Empire.  In the eighteenth 
century, as the Ottoman system of rule took root in the 
cities, local Ottoman families and groups, rose to power.  
In consolidating their power, these “notables” were able to 
pass their power on from one generation to the next.  As a 
result, these notables played a significant role in Ottoman 
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urban politics.  Albert Hourani, explains that this type 
organization arises under certain conditions.  The first 
condition exists when relations of personal dependence 
define societal order.  For example, the artisan in the 
city who produces mainly for patrician patrons, and the 
peasants in the countryside, who produce mainly for the 
land owner, either because they cannot otherwise finance 
themselves or because the landowners hold the key to the 
urban market.  The second condition exists, when urban 
notables dominate society.  These great families, which 
(like those of medieval Italy but not like medieval England 
and France) reside mainly in the city, draw their main 
strength from the cities.  Their position in the cities 
enables them to dominate a rural hinterland.  Finally, the 
notables have some freedom of political action.114 
The politics of notables replaced the function of 
tribes in Arab society as it modernized and as people moved 
from the countryside to the cities.  As people moved from 
the tribal rural environment to the cities, the patriarchal 
ties that helped identify and define a person and their 
place in a tribe became less important.115  The rise of 
notables marked a change in the definition of “belonging” 
from familial to one of common interest.  As long as the 
U.S. Navy can provide the GCC navies with training and 
coordination the U.S. Navy will share common interests with 
the GCC navies and can function as a sort of Persian Gulf 
“notable.”  As the dominant hegemonic power in the region, 
the U.S. and its navy hold the key to sea control. 
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Notables either provided services to their clients, or 
provided access to them.116  The U.S. Navy can act as a 
naval patron and provide the GCC navies training and 
doctrine while utilizing web-based command and control to 
coordinate coalition forces and make them interoperable.117  
Web based command and control would, in effect be a form of 
suzerainty.  Unlike the British, who simply dominated the 
region without regard for indigenous navies, the U.S. Navy 
stands in a position to enhance Arab naval capabilities. 
Separating the proposed patron-client relationship 
between the U.S. and GCC navies from American suzerain 
rule, may seem difficult.  However, the patron-client 
relationship, which to some extend already exists, 
facilitates suzerain rule.  The clients, in this case the 
GCC navies, enhance their capabilities which enables them 
to act in U.S. interests in return for a decreased U.S. 
naval presence.  Confidence in the Arab navies’ ability to 
support American national security goals will then enable 
suzerain control and coordination via a web based command 
and control network. 
The interaction between patron and client is one of 
quid pro quo.118  A relationship, in which a client desires 
to follow a patron, is preferable to a coercive one.  In 
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the case of the GCC states and the United States, one must 
examine why the GCC navies, would want the U.S. as a 
patron.  True, it seems the benefits of improved doctrine, 
tactics, and access to technology and information might 
appeal to these weaker navies but there may be other 
reasons as well.  The interaction between the U.S. and the 
GCC states may be a “power-wielder-power-recipient”119 
relationship.  The quid pro quo nature of the relationship 
reveals the GCC states gain power through association with 
the U.S. Navy and can by intertwining their interests with 
the U.S., the GCC states can decrease American presence in 
the Gulf.  An examination of the GCC’s followership of the 
U.S. during the Gulf War, states 
The manifestly illiberal, non-democratic, and 
sexist nature of the political formations of the 
Gulf states suggests that the broader normative 
vision about the universal aspirations of 
humankind articulated by President Bush is hardly 
shared by those in the Gulf…Perhaps more 
importantly, there was a marked ambivalence in 
these states, widely shared by both governors and 
governed alike, about the desirability of an 
American military presence in the region and a 
preference, particularly in Saudi Arabia, to keep 
American troops “over the horizon.”120 
While the GCC states may be willing to support 
coalitions with the U.S. to gain the benefits of American 
naval power, it is more likely that they simply want to 
reduce U.S. presence in the region and keep U.S. forces 
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over the horizon.  Either way, effective coalition building 
is possible. 
Recent public opinion polls conducted by Zogby 
International and Gallup in the Middle East provide 
addition reasons for the GCC states’ willingness to join 
naval coalitions with the U.S.  A poll conducted in ten 
nations asking about the “Impressions of America” in April 
2002 reveals a strong dislike for American foreign policy 
in the Middle East.121  Of the ten nations, polled three are 
in the GCC: Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and UAE.  The most 
important conclusion from the poll shows that negative 
Muslim views of the U.S. are directly linked to U.S. 
policies in the Middle East.  The Palestinian issue draws 
the greatest criticism because it is viewed as the “most 
important” in the nations polled.122  The United States 
received single digit favorable ratings on U.S. policy 
towards Palestine and the Arab World by every Arab nation 
polled except the UAE where a 15% favorable rating was 
earned.  Demonstrating the interdependence of the Levant 
and the Persian Gulf Region over 83% of those polled in the 
GCC: Saudi Arabia(90%), UAE(83%), and Kuwait(94%) held 
negative views of U.S. policy toward the Palestinians.123  
Finally, those polled in these same countries; show a 
general dislike for the American led efforts to fight 
terrorism.  While the negative views of the War on 
Terrorism were not very strong in the UAE(48%), it was not 
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overwhelmingly positive either.  Saudi Arabia(57%) and 
Kuwait(65%) showed a stronger disapproval rate. 124 
The above polling data seem to indicate the Arab 
public would not support naval coalition building with the 
U.S.  However, since coalition building could lead to a 
decreased U.S. presence in the region, it could be 
publicized in a favorable manner.  In addition, while 
public opinion does matter to these regimes, the rentier 
nature of their governmental structures gives them the 
freedom to interact with the U.S. in this manner without 
consent from their populations.  Finally, an over the 
horizon posture, enabled by the integration of Arab naval 
assets into a common operational picture coordinated via a 
web based command and control network, could positively 
affect Arab public opinion by decreasing the amount of U.S. 
forces in the region. 
D. NAVIES IN ARAB STATE DEVELOPMENT  
The GCC states field small naval forces.  The 
distributive nature of the Arab states is inherently weak.  
Therefore, they maintain strong internal security forces in 
the form of armies and air forces to help perpetuate the 
ruling regimes’ tenuous hold on power.  As a result, for 
these states naval power is exogenous to their national 
security concerns. 
The relative sizes of their internal security forces 
when compared with the sizes of their navies show that the 
forces that provide internal security receive the majority 
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of their regimes’ defense resources.125  In addition, 
examining the details of American Foreign military sales to 
the GCC states shows a much greater emphasis on army and 
air force procurement.  For example, briefs provided by the 
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense’s office 
reveal significantly greater interest in army and air force 
equipment.  Most of the interest in naval systems revolves 
around communications systems.  The limited interest in the 
Harpoon missile system, shows the intention of packaging it 
for launch from air platforms.  Only Oman and Bahrain have 
shown interest in procuring American naval vessels.126 
Since the GCC states show that most of their interest 
lies in maintaining internal security; why should they 
develop naval forces at all?  The answer may lie in an 
examination of state development.  Since many of the states 
in the Middle East were created at the end of the First 
World War, their development has been influenced by “a web 
of international norms and institutions”127 established in 
Europe and throughout the rest of the world.  Ian Lustick 
argues the GCC states continuously focus on internal 
security because they are led by 
A raft of regimes strong enough to suppress 
dissidents but too weak and insecure to risk 
intimate forms of cooperation with their 
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neighbors.128 
While the context of Lustick’s argument lies in 
explaining why no great power has emerged in the Middle 
East, he shows these regimes dedicate a great deal of 
energy to “suppressing dissidents.”  In addition the 
international community has forced “norms” of behavior upon 
the states of the Middle East that have acted to keep 
autocratic regimes in power and to prevent any states from 
using military force to expand their country. 
International norms and great power policies have 
been responsible for blocking the emergence of a 
great power in the Middle East by deterring or 
preventing state-building wars from being fought 
to successful conclusions across existing Middle 
Eastern boundaries.129  
These constraints help explain why there is no great 
Middle Eastern power, and in turn why the GCC states are 
weak.  While the “norms” of the international system have 
prevented the development of a great power in the Middle 
East, “norms” of state development have also driven the GCC 
states to build navies. 
Martha Finnemore, discussing state development, points 
out that states are “continuously evolving” and “states are 
what they do.”130  In the case of the GCC states, they have 
a history of maritime trade from the time of the Ottoman 
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Empire and “pax Britannia.”  Therefore, it is reasonable to 
argue that these states believe they have maritime 
interests and must have a navy to protect them.  Although 
navies are generally expensive to maintain, and it may not 
appear to make sense for these states to try to maintain 
naval forces, they do because 
Systems of norms and social conventions will 
circumscribe any calculations of rational utility 
maximization in important ways…  Contributors… 
investigate the role of norms, identities, and 
social realities in weapons acquisition patterns, 
weapons taboos, humanitarian intervention, the 
dynamics of specific alliances, and military 
postures in specific countries.131 
In other words, while it may not seem rational for the 
GCC states to maintain navies, they do so because that is 
what states do.  In addition, if their neighbors have 
navies, then they too must have navies. 
E. CONCLUSION  
In supporting its foreign objectives in the Middle 
East of containing the Soviet Union, or maintaining 
“stability” (American primacy) in the region and supporting 
the free flow of oil to the world oil market, the United 
States has helped maintain the economies of the GCC states.  
Mainly distributive or rentier, these states rely on the 
rents from oil revenue and foreign investment to maintain 
their economies.132  U.S. Naval presence in the Persian Gulf 
has directly contributed to regional stability by deterring 
aggression and has helped maintain oil prices throughout 
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the world.  As a result, the GCC states have had a “’free 
ride’ on the back of American power.”133 
An analysis of the economic impact of forward-engaged 
naval forces in the Persian Gulf was conducted in 
preparation for the 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review.  “The 
analysis shows linkage between oil prices and naval crisis 
response.”134  Examining the affects of Iraq’s invasion of 
Kuwait in 1990 on the Oil-future market the analysis shows  
With the advent of a crisis, however, future 
availability of oil is in doubt and traders 
attach an uncertainty premium to their asking 
price.135 
When Iraq invaded Kuwait on 2 August 1990, oil prices 
increased immediately.  The first forces to arrive in 
theater capable of sustained action to deter further Iraqi 
aggression against Saudi Arabia were the Eisenhower and 
Independence Carrier Battle Groups, which arrived in the 
region within one week on 8 August.136  Comparing the 
increase in oil prices immediately after the Iraqi invasion 
and “the moderated prices after the response,” the analysis 
estimated “the total worldwide impact of naval crisis 
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response to have been $83.6 billion.”137  The U.S. Navy’s 
presence significantly affected the economies of the GCC 
states and the rest of the world. 
As the dominant naval power in the Persian Gulf, the 
U.S. has the opportunity to lead naval coalitions with the 
GCC states.  The relative strength of the U.S. Navy coupled 
with the weak Arab navies parallels the difference in 
strength between the Arab armies that carried Islam 
throughout vast empires.  Rather than use this difference 
in power for conquest, the U.S. Navy can exploit this 
difference in strength and capabilities to train the Arab 
navies.  This training coupled with suzerainty made 
possible by web-based technologies can enable the U.S. Navy 
to act as a patron for the GCC navies without violating the 
sovereignty of the GCC states.  As their patron, the U.S. 
Navy can provide access for the Arab navies to training, 
exercises, and the development of doctrine, improved 
technology, and interoperability.  Improved 
interoperability between the U.S. Navy and GCC naval units 
could lead to a coalition able to achieve multilateral 
effects.  While Arab public opinion may not favor the 
advancement of U.S. policy in the region; working with the 
U.S. Navy could lead to a decreased presence, which in turn 
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V. NAVAL COALITION BUILDING AND TRANSFORMATION 
Coalition building and the integration of coalition 
forces to produce multilateral effects is a cornerstone of 
transformation.  One of the key concepts of transformation: 
full spectrum dominance, in a naval context, implies being 
everywhere simultaneously.  The U.S. Navy cannot achieve 
this sort of physical presence alone or with coalition 
partners.  However, through web-based integration of 
coalition forces, their platforms, and sensors the U.S. 
Navy can achieve a virtual presence.  This will enable 
rapid responses to any crisis in the Persian Gulf, 
producing the desired dominant and multilateral effects.  
To achieve the desired multilateral effects of naval 
coalition building with the navies of GCC states the United 
States must overcome resistance to this sort of cooperation 
inherent in the GCC.  Historically, the GCC has failed to 
achieve high levels of cooperation due to their fear of 
violations of state sovereignty. 
A. The NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY 
The National Security Strategy of the United States 
(NSS) repeatedly states the U.S. will pursue its national 
security objectives with coalition partners, the U.S. will 
lead these coalitions, and the military will transform to 
meet the challenges of the future with unparalleled 
strength.  Emphasizing the importance of coalition 
building, the NSS states: 
We (the U.S.) will cooperate with other nations 
to deny, contain and curtail our enemies’ efforts 
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to acquire dangerous technologies.138   
Clearly stating the U.S. will work with other nations, 
naval Coalition building directly supports this overall 
strategy.  In the opening statement to the NSS, President 
Bush discusses the force-multiplying effect of coalition 
building saying: 
Alliances and multilateral institutions can 
multiply the strength of freedom-loving 
nations.139 
Again, the President emphasizes the importance of 
coalition building with respect to legitimacy and achieving 
stated goals of the United States. 
Today the U.S. finds itself in the unique position as 
the only superpower in a unipolar world; “a position of 
unparalleled military strength and great economic and 
political influence.”140  While no other country can match 
the United States’ military strength, the terrorist attacks 
on September 11, 2001 reveal the U.S.’ vulnerability as 
well as “a deep vein of global anti-American resentment.”141 
Naval coalitions of the willing142 can directly 
contribute to the execution of the foreign policy of the 
U.S. in the Persian Gulf.  Through the conduct of 
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exercises, the U.S. Navy can improve relationships with the 
navies and governments of the GCC states.  These improved 
relationships will strengthen the bonds between those 
states and the U.S. by developing trust and credibility 
through the continuous focus of improving readiness of all 
GCC naval forces.  Through the establishment of trust and 
credibility the U.S. will more easily “implement its 
strategies by organizing coalitions.”143 
Finally, the NSS directs the military to transform to 
“build and maintain our defenses beyond challenge.”144  
Through transformation, the U.S. can maintain its dominant 
position in the world by deterrence.  By maintaining 
technological advantage inherent in transformation over the 
rest of the world the U.S. can ensure the decisive defeat 
of any potential adversary. 
B. TRANSFORMATION 
The Secretary of Defense has initiated the 
transformation of the military.  Naval coalition building 
with the GCC states can help the U.S. Navy achieve many of 
the transformational goals.  There are: 
Six transformational goals:  first to protect the 
U.S. homeland and our bases overseas; second, to 
project and sustain power in distant theaters; 
third, to deny our enemies sanctuary, making sure 
they know that no corner of the world is remote 
enough,…to protect them from our reach; fourth, 
to protect our information networks from attack; 
fifth, to use information technology to link up 
different kinds of U.S. forces so they can fight 
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jointly; and sixth, to maintain unhindered access 
to space, and protect our space capabilities from 
enemy attack.145 
First by joining the U.S., coalition forces can 
multiply the effects of a U.S. force.  In addition, 
coalition forces may free up U.S. naval assets for other 
missions including homeland defense.  Second, by operating 
with U.S. forces and sharing tactical and operational 
information coalition forces can aid the U.S. in sustaining 
forces in the Persian Gulf.  Third, by linking and sharing 
information with U.S. naval forces, coalition forces can 
add to the overall tactical and operation picture helping 
to deny enemies sanctuary by increasing U.S. force 
awareness.  While coalition forces can not be expected to 
help protect U.S. networks from attack, they are inherently 
joint and if they can link with U.S. forces, they can help 
the overall joint force. 
C. NET CENTRIC WARFARE 
The U.S. Navy’s Transformation Roadmap states that 
“FORCEnet,”146 the application of the net-centric warfare 
concept,147 will form the base on which naval 
transformation will build.  This web-based tool will be a 
culmination of: 
Sensors, networks, decision aids, weapons, and 
supporting systems integrated into a single 
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comprehensive maritime network.148 
The integration of the coalition forces into FORCEnet 
will enable the United States Navy to maintain a common 
operational picture with coalition forces enabling the U.S. 
to dedicate only those assets necessary to execute the 
mission.  A web-based approach to coalition building with 
the GCC navies offers numerous advantages and can help 
achieve multilateral effects without violating the 
bilateral agreements that exist between the U.S. and the 
GCC states and between the member states of the GCC 
themselves.149 
An inherent advantage of web basing is that it 
facilitates the wide dispersion naval forces.  By 
controlling access of coalition partners to web based 
information, the U.S. can allow shifting coalitions to 
function seamlessly, while synchronizing the execution of 
multiple tasks or sequential operations in which coalition 
partners may only be willing to participate in specific 
phases of an operation or can not participate due to 
constraints.  For example, a coalition partner may provide 
data on a surface vessel in the Persian Gulf; this partner 
may be unable to execute the specific mission with regard 
to this contact due to political constraints but may be 
able to push information acquired from indigenous sensors 
to the common operational picture.  Then, a second 
coalition partner, by pulling the information from the web 
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pushed there by the first coalition partner may then be 
able to execute the desired mission. 
A web-based approach enables the U.S. to achieve 
asymmetric fighting effects by providing a common picture 
to coalition partners.  This asymmetry can help synchronize 
the battle rhythm of the coalition, to multiply its force.  
By allowing coalition, partners to push and pull 
information to and from the web the coalition force can 
produce persistent surveillance of the entire Persian Gulf 
to track movements of potential adversaries enabling rapid 
engagement. 
C. THE JOINT VISION 
Inherently Joint, Naval coalition building supports 
the “Joint Vision.”  Joint Vision 2020 says to accomplish 
the objectives from the President; future joint forces must 
realize full spectrum dominance: 
The ability of US forces, operating unilaterally 
or in combination with multinational and 
interagency partners, to defeat any adversary and 
control any situation across the full range of 
military operations.150 
Through web-based command and control, the U.S. Navy 
can exploit multiple sensors, agencies, and platforms to 
achieve a decisive tactical advantage over any adversary.  
In addition, web basing provides the U.S. with the 
flexibility to fight with coalition partners or fight 
unilaterally.151  Web-basing will enable the GCC naval 
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coalition partners, with their limited capabilities to 
become a part of the common operational picture and benefit 
from the U.S. interagency resources.  Any input they can 
push to the picture will enhance the coalition’s 
situational awareness.  Finally, web-basing will enable the 
Joint Task Force (JTF) Commander to command from the 
Central theater or external to it, in the air, on land, or 
at sea.   It also enables a JTF Commander to maintain a 
standing and continuous means of communicating guidance and 
direction to naval forces.  By using web-basing as a 
collaborative tool to enable interagency integration, the 
U.S. can exploit its asymmetric capabilities. 
D. DOCTRINE AND TRAINING 
In order to implement the use of a web-based tool like 
FORCEnet to achieve the goals discussed in the National 
Security Strategy and Joint Vision 2020, the Joint Force 
must overcome a series of obstacles.  Conducting frequent 
training and exercises will enable the JTF Commander to 
discover capabilities and limitations of working with U.S., 
interagency, and coalition partners.  The JTF commander 
must know what capabilities are gained and lost through the 
addition and subtraction of different units in the common 
operational picture.  The JTF commander must also recognize 
and understand the political and cultural environments of 
coalition partners to optimize their capabilities.  
Finally, the JTF commander will always have to struggle to 
achieve true interoperability between the U.S. and Arab 
naval coalition forces.  If a JTF Commander can overcome 
interoperability problems between the U.S. and GCC navies, 
a coalition force working from a common operational picture 
  70 
will have the potential to realize Dominant Maneuver152 to 
achieve precision engagement and Rapid Decisive 
Operations.153 
The U.S. Navy conducts frequent exercises and training 
with the Arab navies.  The U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) 
web page states: 
The U.S. Navy participates in over 40 joint naval 
and military  exercises annually with members of 
the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), other foreign 
allies and friends, as well as U.S. military 
forces in the region.  Deterrence is the ultimate 
goal of this cooperative engagement, but 
preparing jointly as a team to quickly defeat any 
adversary remains a cornerstone of the Navy’s 
strategy in the region should deterrence fail.154 
The page then goes on to list a few bilateral 
exercises that the U.S. Navy conducts with the Arab navies.  
The number of exercises should focus on accomplishing 
multilateral effects through web-based coordination and the 
development of common operational doctrine. 
While web-based coordination may not yet be available, 
it may be possible to overcome this by coordinating 
coalition efforts through one American naval entity, which 
could conduct multiple bi-lateral exercises with the Arab 
states to create multi-lateral effects.  For example, one 
Naval vessel or one staff could coordinate multiple 
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exercises simultaneously.  Either way, there would be one 
unifying entity in the group shaping the overall direction 
of the exercises. 
E. CONCLUSION 
Naval Coalition building with the GCC states directly 
supports the National Security Strategy and Joint Vision 
2020.  Through transformation and exploiting Internet 
technology the U.S. can enable coalition partners to 
execute the missions of the U.S. Navy within the region, 
freeing U.S. naval assets to help with homeland security 
and other missions.  Limited resources make it impossible 
to fully patrol every single square mile of the Persian 
Gulf, however GCC naval assets, held together through web 
based command and control could improve awareness and 
shorten response time to possible areas of crisis without 
violating the sovereignty of any of these states.  A 
standing Joint Task Force headquarters will be necessary to 
administrate and maintain a web based common operational 
picture enabling effective naval coalition building between 
the U.S. and GCC navies.  In addition, a permanent JTF will 
provide the continuity required to apply lessons from 
exercises in developing an effective doctrine designed to 
achieve multilateral effects and full spectrum dominance.  
Lastly, a permanent JTF will give the U.S. the flexibility 
to work within the framework of a coalition of the willing 
or act unilaterally to achieve foreign policy goals. 
With “capabilities based” planning, the U.S. Navy is 
no longer confined to work within the two major theater war 
framework.155  As a result, military tasks that demand 
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capabilities drive a flexible force structure.156  Frequent 
exercises can enhance the Arab navies’ capabilities to 
deter aggression by improving their readiness and training.  
Deterrence of aggression supports stability and in turn 
American primacy in the region.  As well, the support of 
the free flow of oil to the world oil market can also be 
enforced or enhanced by training, exercising, and working 
with the navies of the GCC States to teach them how to 
protect sea lanes to aid American forces in controlling the 
sea.157  This will help maintain the economies of the United 
States and its trading partners, which are more dependent 
upon oil from the region than the United States. 
Finally, by enabling the GCC partners to push 
information to or pull it from a web-based operational net, 
the JTF commander can work around the threat of violating 
the sovereignty of any of the GCC states and achieve 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
Since WWII, the United States has played a vital role 
in the security of the Persian Gulf region.  The American 
hegemonic presence in the region enables the United States 
to ensure the stability of the world’s oil market by 
guaranteeing an uninterrupted supply of oil from the 
Persian Gulf region.  Europe and the Far East purchase a 
higher percentage of their oil from the Persian Gulf region 
than the United States.  If the United States continues to 
maintain a hegemonic presence in the region then in turn, 
the United States can maintain hegemony over the rest of 
the world. 
U.S. foreign policy toward the Persian Gulf Region has 
evolved since the end of the Second World War.  A series of 
presidential doctrines have supported three consistent 
national security goals: the support of Israel, the support 
of access to oil, and the enforcement of American hegemony 
in the region.  While this third goal was usually couched 
in terms of containing Soviet expansion, the natural 
byproduct was American primacy. 
Naval Coalition building with the GCC states could 
lead to a reduced U.S. presence in the Persian Gulf.  By 
giving greater responsibility to the local states, while 
linking them with American sensors and databases the U.S. 
Navy could maintain a virtual presence from over the 
horizon.  This approach would slightly relieve the United 
States’ naval burden in the region while preserving the 
effects of the current American security posture, 
maintaining the free flow of oil to the world oil market, 
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and preventing any other nations from establishing a 
hegemonic presence in the region. 
Maintaining the continuous supply of oil to the world 
oil market directly affects the American economy.  As the 
American economy and population grow in the environment of 
globalization, it is imperative that the United States 
maintains the free flow of oil enabled by its presence in 
the region. 
While U.S. military presence in the Persian Gulf helps 
to ensure stability by deterring aggression in the region, 
it also adds to Arab public resentment of the United 
States.  While American goals in the region have not 
significantly changed since their inception, Arab public 
opinion and economic constraints work to resist the 
perceived intrusive U.S. presence in the region.  In 
support of U.S. interests in the region the US: works to 
ensure access to host nation facilities, prepositions 
military equipment, builds host nation self defense 
capabilities through foreign military sales, training and 
joint exercises and provides continuously deployed forward 
U.S. military presence in the region.  The continuously 
deployed forces on the Arabian Peninsula are the single 
greatest source of resentment toward the United States.  
These land-based forces fulfill roles the United States 
Navy cannot fulfill due to limited resources and multiple 
tasking. 
The naval component of the American security posture 
in the Persian Gulf fulfills a number of missions 
including: strike, surface warfare, subsurface warfare, 
Maritime Interdiction Operations or MIO and no fly-zone 
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enforcement in support of the sanctions against Iraq, naval 
presence or deterrence, and protection of the sea lanes.  
These missions all support the grand strategy in the region 
by maintaining stability, American hegemony, and the free 
flow of oil to the world oil market.  Expanding and 
changing the role of coalition naval forces can alleviate 
the burden of stationing ground forces in the Persian Gulf 
region by United States.  By implementing changes to the 
nature of naval coalitions with the states of the Persian 
Gulf region the United States can reduce the number of 
forces forward deployed to the region while maintaining 
hegemony and advancing American foreign policy objectives. 
As the war on terrorism and the Arab-Israeli conflict 
continue, Arab public opinion of the United States 
continues to decline.  It is imperative the U.S. seeks 
alternative ways of maintaining hegemony while reducing 
visibility to the Arab public.  The United States cannot 
expect that the navies of the GCC to provide a sustained 
presence in the Persian Gulf in the same manner that an 
American Carrier battle group or an Expeditionary Strike 
Force can.  However, these navies have the potential based 
on number of assets and geographical location to provide 
flexible and rapid responses to dynamic situations.  They 
can supplement naval presence (deterrence), MIO, and 
protection of the shipping lanes.  To test this approach 
the United States should continue to engage these navies in 
bilateral exercises that work to hone and flex the skills 
of these navies.  The overall goals of these exercises 
should focus on achieving multilateral coalition effects to 
minimize the effects of the bilateral nature of the 
agreements between these states and the United States to 
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create a strong naval coalition presence.  In addition, the 
exercises should focus on coalition naval forces working to 
achieve the same goals sought by the current security 
posture of the United States in the Persian Gulf region. 
Cultural differences between the GCC states and the 
United States have driven the United States to form 
bilateral agreements with them rather than multi-lateral or 
collective defense agreements.  Although the GCC was 
created for cooperative defense, it has failed to function 
as designed because the GCC states fear violations of their 
territorial and political sovereignty. 
Finally, a web based approach to coalition building 
through transformation can help the U.S. achieve its long 
standing national security goals while reducing American 
presence in the region.  In the past, the Nixon Doctrine 
and Dual Containment rested the national security goals of 
the United States on the internal politics of Arab states. 
In doing this the U.S. gave Arab populations the impression 
that the U.S. was propping up these autocratic and 
repressive regimes.  The distributive or rentier structure 
of these states is inherently weak as the ruling regimes 
maintain a tenuous hold on their power.  Unable to reform 
due to alliances they have made with their political cores, 
these regimes will try to use America’s relationship with 
Israel to distract their disgruntled populations from 
destabilizing their regimes.  The attacks of September 11, 
2001 demonstrate the danger inherent in supporting these 
regimes.  By building stronger coalitions through web-based 
technology, the U.S. can reduce the presence of U.S. forces 
in the region.  This reduced presence, has the potential to 
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placate Arab anger toward the U.S. and in turn increase 
national security. 










THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
  79 
LIST OF REFERENCES 
Ajami, Fouad.  The Dream Palace of the Arabs.  New York, 
Vintage Books: 1998. 
 
Benn, Aluf.  “Analysis/Abdullah’s proposal takes 
everyone by surprise.”  Ha’aretz, English Edition 
online: www.haaretzdaily.com, accessed: 29 May 2002. 
 
Brooks, Stephen G and Wohlforth, William C.  
“American Primacy in Perspective.”   Foreign Affairs.  
July/August 2002.  
 
Bush, George H.W. United States, President, National 
Security Strategy of the United States: 1990-1991.  
Washington, Brassey’s (US), Inc.: 1990. 11. 
 
Bush, George W., United States, President, The 
National Security Strategy of the United States of 
America.  Washington D.C.: GPO 2002. 
 
Byford, Grenville. “The Wrong War.”  Foreign Affairs  
July/August 2002. 
 
Cebrowski, Arthur K. and Garstka, John J.  “Network 
Centric Warfare: Its Origin and Future,” Strategy and 
Force Planning.  3rd ed.  Ed. Strategy and Force 
Planning Faculty.  Newport, R.I. Naval War College 
Press: 2000. 
 
Chairman , Joint Chiefs of Staff,  “Full Spectrum 
Dominance” in Joint Vision 2020  Washington DC, US 
Government Printing Office, 2002. 
 
CIA web page.  “CIA-The World Fact Book 2002-Qatar.”  
www.odci.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/qa.html.  
Accessed 12 December 2002. 
 
 
Clark, Vern, ADM, Chief of Naval Operations in “Sea 
Power 21,” US Naval Institute web page:  
www.usni.org/Proceedings/Articles02/PROcno10.htm, 
accessed 4 Nov 2002.   
 
  80 
Clark, Vern, ADM, Chief of Naval Operations, “Power 
and Access…From the Sea,” Naval Transformation 
Roadmap.   
 
Cleveland, William L.  A History of the Modern Middle 
East, Boulder, CO. Westview Press: 2000. 
 
Clinton, William Jefferson.  United States, 
President,  National Security Strategy of the United 
States 1994-1995, Engagement and Enlargement. 
Washington D.C., Brassey’s: 1993.  
 
Cooper, Andrew Fenton, Higgott, Richard A., and 
Nossal, Kim Richard “Bound to Follow?  Leadership and 
Followership in the Gulf Conflict,” Political Science 
Quarterly. Volume 106, Issue 3, Autumn 1991. 
 
Christian, Jonathan, CDR USN. The Joint Staff, J-5 
Middle East, The Pentagon, Interview, Washington 
D.C., 26 June 2002. 
 
Denoeux, Guilain.  Urban Unrest in the Middle East.  
Albany, New York, State University of New York Press: 
1993. 
 
Department of Defense.  “Executive Summary” from 
Network Centric Warfare.  Report to Congress, 
September 2001. 
 
Dur, Philip A.  “Presence: Forward, Ready Engaged.”  
Strategy and Force Planning.  3rd ed.  Ed. Strategy 
and Force Planning Faculty.  Newport, R.I. Naval War 
College Press: 2000. 
 
Eickelman, Dale F. “What is a Tribe?”  The Middle 
East and Central Asia.  Upper Saddle River, New 
Jersey, Simon and Schuster: 1998.  
 
Finnemore, Martha  “Defining State Interests,”  
National Interests in International Society. Ithaca, 
N.Y., Cornell University Press: 1996. 
 
Fromkin, David.  A Peace to End All Peace.  New York, 
Henry Holt and Company: 1989. 
 
  81 
Gaddis, John Lewis.  Strategies of Containment: A 
Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National 
Security Policy.  Oxford, London: Oxford University 
Press, 1982. 
 
Gause, F. Gregory.  “The Illogic of Dual 
Containment.”  Foreign Affairs.  March /April 1994.  
 
Gerges, Fawaz A.  America and Political Islam, Clash 
of Cultures or Clash of Interests?  New York, 
Cambridge University Press: 1999.   
 
Glubb, John.  The Life and Times of Muhammad.  New York, 
Madison Books: 1998. 
 
Goldschmidt, Arthur Jr.  A Concise History of the Middle 
East. 7th ed. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 2002. 
 
Gordon, Michael R. and Trainor, Bernard E.  The General’s 
War, New York, Little, Brown and Company: 1995.   
 
Hajjar, Sami G.  “U.S. Military Presence in the Gulf: 
Challenges and Prospects.”  U.S. Army War College, 
Strategic Studies Institute.  March 2002. 
 
Hirsh, Michael.  “Bush and the World.”  Foreign 
Affairs.  September/October 2002. 
 
Hourani, Albert.  A History of Arab Peoples.  New 
York, Warner Books Inc.: 1991. 
 
Hourani, Albert.  “Ottoman Reform and the Politics of 
Notables.” 
 
Hurst, Steven.  The Foreign Policy of the Bush 
Administration: In Search of a New World Order. New 
York: Cassell, 1999. 
 
Indyk, Martin.  “Back to the Bazaar”  Foreign 
Affairs, Jan-Feb 2002.  
 
Indyk, Martin.  “The Clinton Administration’s 
Approach to the Middle East” Soref Symposium 18 May 
1993.   
 
  82 
Islam, Hesham.  LCDR USN.  Deputy Chief of Naval 
Operations (Plans, Policy and Operations), Middle 
East, Africa South Asia Branch, The Pentagon, 
Interview, Washington D.C. 26 June 2002. 
 
Islam, Hesham.  “American Interests in the Persian 
Gulf.”  The Roots of Regional Ambitions,  Masters 
Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey ,Ca 1992.   
 
Joint Staff J8, Dominant Maneuver Operational Concept.  
Prepared for the JROC, 19 July 2002. 
 
Kagan, Robert.  “The Benevolent Empire.”  Strategy 
and Force Planning.  3rd Ed.  Eds.  The Strategy and 
Force Planning Faculty, Newport, RI, Naval War 
College Press: 2000. 
 
Kaufman, Burton I.  The Arab Middle East and the 
United States, Inter-Arab Rivalry and Superpower 
Diplomacy.  New York, Simon and Schuster Mcmillan: 
1996. 
 
Kwietowski, Karen, LTCOL USAF.  Office of the 
Assistant Secretary of Defense, Interview. 26 June 
2002. 
 
Lapidus, Ira M.  A History of Islamic Societies.  New 
York: Cambridge University Press: 1988.  
 
Lenczowski, George.  American Presidents and the 
Middle East, Durham, N.C., Duke University Press:  
1990. 
 
Lewis, Bernard.  What Went Wrong? Western Impact and 
Middle East Response.  New York: Oxford University 
Press: 2002.  
 
Looney, Robert E. “The Gulf Cooperation Council’s 
Cautious Approach to Economic Integration.”  Middle 
East Insight.  Forthcoming 2003.  
 
Looney, Robert E., Schrady, David A., and Brown, 
Ronald L.  “Estimating the Economic Benefits of 
Forward Engaged Naval Forces.”  Interfaces  July-
August 2001.  
 
  83 
Luciano, Giacomo  “The Oil Rent, the Fiscal Crisis of 
the States and Democratization,” in Democracy without 
Democrats, The Renewal of Politics in the Muslim 
World.  Ed. Ghassan Salame.  New York, I.B. Taurus 
Publishers: 1994. 
 
Lustick, Ian S. ‘The Absence of Middle Eastern Great 
Powers: Political ‘Backwardness’ in Historical 
Perspective,” International Organization 51, 4, The 
IO Foundation and the Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology: Autumn 1997. 
     
Matthews, Ken.  The Gulf Conflict and international 
Relations.  New York, Routledge: 1993. 
 
McDougal, Walter A.  “Back to Bedrock.”  Foreign 
Affairs.  March/April 1997.  
 
Mernissi, Fatema.  Islam and Democracy Fear of the 
Modern World. Cambridge, Ma, Perseus Publishing: 
2002. 
 
Migdal, Joel S. Strong States and Weak Societies, 
Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press: 1988. 
 
Milnet web page www.milnet.com accessed 7 September 
2002. 
 
Nixon, Richard.  Seize the Moment, America’s Challenge in a 
One-Superpower World.  New York, Simon and Schuster: 1992.   
 
Nixon, Richard M. 1999, Victory without War. New York: 
Simon and Schuster: 1988. 
 
Norton, Augustus Richard.  Amal and the Shi’a.  
Austin, University of Texas Press: 1987. 
 
Nye, Joseph S. “The Changing Nature of World Power.”  
Political Science Quarterly.  Summer 1990. 
 
Peterson, Erik R.  The Gulf Cooperation Council, A 
Search for Unity in a Dynamic Region, Boulder, 
Colorado, Westview Press: 1988. 
 
  84 
Pokrant, Marvin.  Desert Shield at Sea, What the Navy 
Really Did.  Westport, Connecticut, Greenwood Press: 
1999. 
 
Pokrant, Marvin.  Desert Storm at Sea, What the Navy 
Really Did.  Westport, Connecticut, Greenwood Press: 
1999. 
 
Rosen, Lawrence.  The Justice of Islam.  New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2000.  
 
Rouleau, Eric. “Trouble in the Kingdom.”  Foreign Affairs.  
July/August 2002. 
 
Rubin, Barry.  “The Real Roots of Arab Anti-
Americanism.”  Foreign Affairs.  November/December 
2002.   
 
Rubin, Jeffrey, Z.  Ed. Dynamics of Third Party 
Intervention, Kissinger in the Middle East.  New 
York, Praeger Books: 1981. 
 
Rumsfeld, Donald H.  “Transforming the Military.”  
Foreign Affairs. May/Jun 2002. 
 
Scoratow, Leon B.  Unpublished essay.  Naval 
Postgraduate School, 2002.  
 
Smith, Charles D. Palestine and the Arab-Israeli 
Conflict, A History with Documents.  4th ed. New York, 
Bedford/St. Martin’s: 2001. 
     
Stavridis, James G., RADM USN.  Navy Operations 
Group/Deep Blue, Director, The Pentagon, Interview, 
Washington D.C., 26 June 2002. 
 
The Middle East and the United States. 2nd ed.  David 
W. Lesch, Boulder Colorado: Westview Press, 1996.  
 
The United States and the Middle East, A Search for 
New Perspectives.  Ed.  Hoosang Amirahmadi.  Albany: 
State University of New York Press: 1993.  
 
The United States Navy in “Desert Shield” “Desert 
Storm”.  Department of the Navy, Office of the Chief 
of Naval Operations, Washington, DC: 15 May 1991. 
  85 
 
Tidd, Kurt., CAPT USN.  Navy Operations Group/Deep 
Blue, The Pentagon, Interview, Washington D.C., 14 
February 2002 
 
Tyler, Patrick E.  “Security Council Votes, 15-0, For 
Tough Iraq Resolution; Bush Calls it a ‘Final Test’, 
Clock Ticks for Hussein.”  New York Times 9 November 
2002. 
 
Tyler, Patrick E. and MacFarquhar, Neil.  “Mubarak to 
Press Bush on a State for Palestinians.”  New York 
Times, 4 June 2002. 
     
U.S. Joint Forces Command. “Toward a Joint 
Warfighting Concept: Rapid Decisive Operations,” RDO 
Whitepaper Version 2.0, 18 July 2002.   
    
USCENTCOM Web page: 
http://www.cusnc.navy.mil/pages/engage.htm  Accessed 
28 Oct 2002. 
 
Vitas, Robert A. and Williams, John Allen. Eds.  U.S. 
Security Policy and Strategy, 1987-1994, Documents 
and Policy Proposals.  Westport, Connecticut, 
Greenwood Press: 1996. 
 
Yiftachel, Oren “‘Ethnocracy’: The Politics of 
Jaudaizing Israel/Palestine.”  Middle East Report. 
Summer 1998. 
 
Zogby, John.  “The Ten Nation Impressions of America Poll.”  
Zogby International.  Utica, N.Y.  11 April 2002.  On  
https://zogby.com accessed 02 December 2002.  























THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 
  87 
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 
1. Defense Technical Information Center 
Ft. Belvoir, VA  
 
2. Dudley Knox Library 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA  
 
3. Navy Operations Group/DEEP BLUE 
Chief Of Naval Operations 
2000 Navy Pentagon 
Washington, D.C. 
 
4. Dr. James E. Wirtz 
Chairman, National Security Affairs (Code 38) 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California 
 
5. Dr. James E. Russell 
National Security Affairs (Code 38) 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California 
 
6. Dr. Glenn E. Robinson 
National Security Affairs (Code 38) 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California 
 
7. LT Samuel F. de Castro 
132 Lexington Avenue 
Buffalo, New York 
 
